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This dissertation explores and applies experimental methods in economics. The first two
chapters deal with the methodology of lab experiments, while the third presents a study on
mobility apps. In the first chapter, I examine deliberating groups in a jury-like setting where
subjects have private information and an opportunity to discuss it before a vote. The study
uses a belief elicitation mechanism to incentivize subjects to truthfully report their beliefs
both before and after they deliberate, allowing for the measurement of the change in beliefs. I
find that deliberation tends to reduce the average error in beliefs, measured as the difference
between the belief and the true outcome. The basic experiment follows past deliberation
experiments in the literature. It features an abstract setting with private signals in the
form of a randomly drawn red or blue ball. To test whether the results are generalizable,
I replicated this experiment in a framed setting where subjects read the evidence from a
real murder trial. I found no difference between the results of the experiments in these
two different settings. The second chapter investigates the use of reinforcement methods
in lab experiment instructions. We experimentally compare how methods of delivering
and reinforcing experiment instructions impact subjects’ comprehension and retention
of payoff-relevant information. We find combinations of reinforcement methods that can
eliminate half of non money-maximizing behaviour, and we find that we can induce a similar
reduction via enhancements to the content of instructions. Residual non money-maximizing
behaviour suggests this may be an important source of noise in experimental studies. The
third chapter diverges from lab experiments to study Mobility as a Service (MaaS). We
test whether a multimodal route-planning service caused users to use combined routes
featuring both ride hailing and transit. We find that ride-hailing trips connected with rail
stops increased from 3.0% of trips to 5.5% among existing users. In areas where the feature
supported bus connections, trips connecting to bus stops increased from 4.6% to 8.7% among
existing users.
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Chapter 1




Many institutions rely on deliberating groups to reach decisions in situations
with limited information. In this study, I examine deliberating groups in a
jury-like setting where subjects have private information and an opportunity
to discuss it before a vote. The study uses a belief elicitation mechanism to
incentivize subjects to truthfully report their beliefs both before and after they
deliberate, allowing for the measurement of the change in beliefs. Deliberation
tends to reduce the average error in beliefs, where error is measured as the
difference between a reported belief and the truth. The basic experiment featured
an abstract setting with private signals in the form of a randomly drawn red or
blue ball. To test for generalizability, I replicated this experiment in a framed
setting where subjects read the evidence from a real murder trial. I found no
difference between the results of the experiments in these two different settings.
Keywords: Jury trials, deliberative voting, belief updating, information
aggregation.
JEL Classification: C92, D70, D80, K40
Deliberation is a decision-making process that involves a period of discussion followed
by a vote. Government legislatures, central bank committees, corporate boards, and juries
in both civil and criminal courts all use deliberation to reach decisions. Deliberation
†I am grateful to my supervisor, David Freeman, for very helpful feedback and guidance. I would also like
to thank Erik Kimbrough, Alexander Billy, Douglas Allen, and the seminar audiences at SFU, the Public
Choice Society annual meeting, and the Canadian Economics Association annual meeting for their feedback
and comments.
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allows more information aggregation than simple voting, as a deliberating group can share
private information before reaching a decision. Each individual can make a more informed
decision about how to vote by incorporating others’ private information. In principle, this
means that deliberating groups can make better decisions than they would by voting
without deliberating. However, this benefit depends on the members truthfully sharing their
information and efficiently incorporating it into their votes, which is far from guaranteed.
The existing theoretical and experimental literature on deliberation discusses the
practice in an abstract setting. In the canonical deliberation experiment, there are two
possible states of the world (red and blue) and each subject is shown a private signal
(in the form of a red or blue ball) with a known probability of matching the true state
(Guarnaschelli et al., 2000; Goeree and Yariv, 2011; Bhattacharya et al., 2014; Bouton
et al., 2017). Subjects communicate and then vote according to a decision rule that varies
from experiment to experiment. This framework allows the researcher to induce subjects
to hold certain beliefs by delivering a signal that can only imply one possible belief. For
instance, if the researcher informs subjects that there is always a 70% chance that a signal
matches the true state, a red signal can only imply a 70% chance of red. After receiving the
signal, subjects may choose to share their signals with each other before voting. The outcome
of the vote determines the final outcome according to the decision rule. This framework was
designed to correspond closely to theoretical models of deliberating groups.
Although beliefs are important at every stage of the deliberation process, researchers
cannot observe them. As a result, past experiments have informed subjects of the
distribution of possible signals so that a subject receiving a given signal has enough
information to compute the probability of a given outcome. That subjects actually compute
this probability is a modelling assumption that does not need to be literally true for
deliberation models to deliver valuable insights. The experimental setup used throughout
the literature has the advantage of providing researchers with a high level of control, but
it raises questions about whether real-world deliberation is similar enough to laboratory
deliberation for the results to hold across settings.
A core assumption of all the experiments in the experimental deliberation literature is
that deliberation occurs in a similar way in different environments (e.g. in the laboratory and
in a real jury). This study tests that assumption by modifying the standard experimental
design to allow for subjectivity in the signals presented to subjects. The standard
deliberation experiment features a private signal, a communication round, and a vote, in
that order. All treatments in this study include an additional voting round before the
communication round and a belief elicitation during each of the two votes. This change has
two advantages. First, beliefs do not need to be imposed if they can instead be measured.
Second, within-subject changes in votes and beliefs can be observed by comparing subjects’
decisions before and after deliberation.
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This study replicated the standard deliberation experiment described above as a
baseline, including the additional voting round and elicitations. In this treatment, the true
state was either red or blue, and each subject was shown an independent draw of a red
or blue ball. This ball had a 70% chance of matching the true state. A second treatment
included a subjective task where subjects observed a grid of 400 red and blue balls and
attempted to judge which colour occurred more frequently. Finally, the study included a
framed treatment where subjects read news reports from real jury trials and attempted to
determine the guilt of the defendant.
The experiment produced three key results. First, deliberation successfully aggregates
individuals’ private information. The average belief error fell from 44.6% before deliberation
to 38.4% afterwards. Second, for a given set of initial beliefs in a group, deliberation leads
people to update their beliefs in a similar way regardless of the informational setting.
A regression model of belief updating did not find significant differences between the
treatments. This result provides evidence o the external validity of deliberation experiments
in abstract laboratory settings.
Finally, a supplementary benefit of measuring both beliefs and votes is that comparing
them makes it possible to infer the threshold at which subjects change their votes. Theory
predicts that jurors who believe they may have conflicting voting thresholds have some
incentive to not communicate truthfully (Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2006). The third
key result is that most jurors vote consistently with a voting threshold of 50%, even if
their incentives suggest a different threshold. This is consistent with the heuristic strategy
observed by Le Quement and Marcin (2020), wherein people share their signals truthfully
and then vote with the majority of signals regardless of strategic concerns.
The study of deliberative decision making, wherein a group can share information before
a vote, grew out of the literature on strategic voting in the Condorcet jury model framework
(Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1997, 1998). In Condorcet jury models, a group of people
with aligned interests but limited information must vote on a binary decision. The central
idea in the strategic voting literature is that if voters care about the vote’s outcome, each
must vote under the assumption that their vote is pivotal. Under certain decision rules,
this can mean voting against one’s private information. The theory of deliberative voting
was developed by adding communication prior to the voting process. Coughlan (2000) and
Gerardi and Yariv (2007) find that jurors with sufficiently aligned interests will truthfully
share their private information before voting, making that private information public and
thereby eliminating differences between voting rules.
Following Coughlan’s (2000) theoretical framework, Guarnaschelli et al. (2000)
developed the standard experimental design that characterizes the experimental deliberation
literature. In their jury experiment, Guarnaschelli et al. varied the group size (3 or 6),
decision rule (majority or unanimity), and presence of a straw poll. Their findings were
consistent with deliberation theory. In the absence of communication, jurors show signs
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of strategic voting. However, communication leads most jurors to truthfully reveal their
signals and vote with the majority of signals. Goeree and Yariv (2011) conducted a similar
experiment with unrestricted communication replacing the straw poll. They introduced
a treatment with asymmetric and private incentives, theorized by Austen-Smith and
Feddersen (2006) to prevent truthful information sharing under a unanimity rule. Contrary
to theory, Goeree and Yariv showed that jurors tend to over-share information truthfully
despite incentive asymmetry.
Fehrler and Hughes (2018) modified this framework to model committees subject to
professional consequences from outside observers. They assigned each juror to be either a
high-information or low-information type, where there are negative consequences to publicly
revealing that one is a low-information type. The authors found that making deliberation
transparent to outside observers negatively affects the group’s ability to aggregate their
private information.
By testing subjects’ preferences before a jury experiment, Le Quement and Marcin
(2020) tested various theories to explain why subjects tend to be truthful when doing so
does not maximize their expected payoffs. Le Quement and Marcin found that roughly
80% of subjects play heuristically, sharing their signals truthfully and then voting with the
majority signal, while the other 20% play more strategically, sharing information and voting
in a way that approximates theoretical predictions.
1.1 Theory
The theory in this section loosely follows the setup in Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006),
with the slight modification that the signal strength is not consistent across jurors. In the
standard Condorcet jury model, a jury comprised of three people must decide whether to
convict or acquit a criminal defendant. The guilt or innocence of the defendant is assigned
randomly with equal probability before the jurors observe the evidence. Each juror receives
a private and independent signal related to the guilt of the defendant. Denote juror i’s signal
as si ∈ (0, 1). Jurors can report their signals to each other prior to voting, either truthfully
or not. For simplicity, I assume the decision of what signal to report is simultaneous. Finally,
jurors vote for conviction or acquittal, with the majority vote determining the outcome.
The Signal Structure The odds of receiving a signal of si is si if the defendant is guilty
and 1 − si if the defendant is innocent. This means that P (Guilty|si) = si. Furthermore,
multiple signals can be combined according to Bayes’ rule. The likelihood-ratio form of the
rule takes the following form given independent signals:
P (Guilty|s1, . . . , sn)








The combination of signals depends on whether other jurors share them.
1.1.1 behavioural Model
Jurors’ preferences are solely related to the trial’s outcome (acquittal or conviction) and
the true state of the world (innocence or guilt). Assume symmetry of preferences for now:
Jurors get a high payoff of H if a correct outcome occurs (convicting the guilty or acquitting
the innocent) and a low payoff of L if an incorrect outcome occurs (convicting the innocent
or acquitting the guilty). Let H > L, and assume common knowledge of these preferences.
The expected utility, EU , for all jurors given the probability of guilt is
EU =
P (Guilty)H + P (Innocent)L for ConvictionP (Guilty)L+ P (Innocent)H for Acquittal. (1.2)
It follows from Equation (1.2) that when P(Guilty)=P(Innocent)=0.5, jurors are indifferent
between conviction and acquittal. If P(Guilty) is higher than 0.5, jurors prefer to convict,
while if it is lower than 0.5 they prefer to acquit.
Given this relationship between jurors’ beliefs about guilt and their votes, is it optimal
for jurors to truthfully share their signals with their fellow jurors? Since jurors only care
about achieving the correct outcome, they will report a signal that maximizes the odds of
their fellow jurors voting correctly.
Strategic voting implies that jurors should vote as if they were the pivotal voter since
this is the only case in which their vote determines the outcome.1 In this particular setup
(majority voting with three jurors and a flat prior about the superior outcome), being the
pivotal voter means that the other two voters voted differently from one another. Since
these votes provide equal and opposite signals about the true state (guilt or innocence), the
pivotal vote should vote in accordance with their own signal.2
Let s̃i be the signal reported by juror i. Assuming juror j believes that juror i is reporting







For s̃i > 0.5, juror j’s vote will be changed from acquittal to conviction so long as 1− s̃i <
sj < 0.5. Similarly, for s̃i < 0.5, juror j’s vote will be changed from conviction to acquittal
so long as 0.5 < sj < 1− s̃i.
1This follows from the assumption that jurors are only motivated by the outcome of the vote. This may
not always be true in practice. For instance, it may not hold when people engage in expressive voting. (see
Tyran, 2004).
2The strategic vote is also a naïve vote in this scenario, since the assumption that one’s vote is pivotal
doesn’t give extra information.
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It follows that s̃i = si is the optimal reported signal. Given a truthfully reported si, juror
j will vote to convict if P (Guilty|si, sj) > 0.5 and to acquit if P (Guilty|si, sj) < 0.5. This
is optimal from juror i’s perspective; if they reported s̃i > si then juror j would sometimes
vote for conviction when P (Guilty|si, sj) < 0.5. Similarly, if he reported s̃i < si then juror
j would sometimes vote for acquittal when P (Guilty|si, sj) > 0.5. The same is true of the
third juror.
Since being truthful is an optimal strategy if others assume you are truthful, and
assuming others are truthful is an optimal strategy if they really are truthful, the truthful
reporting of signals is an equilibrium. Therefore, all jurors truthfully report their signals
and vote unanimously for the outcome that is more likely to deliver a high payoff given all
the signals.
Partisan Incentives Sometimes, real jurors enter the courtroom with preconceptions
that affect how they vote. To model this, suppose that all jurors have heterogeneous and
private incentives. Assume that each juror has an equal (and independent) probability of
being a partisan for conviction or acquittal and that no jurors are non-partisan. A partisan
receives a payoff of 3H if the jury correctly chooses his partisan outcome. These incentives
match those in the “weak partisan” treatment of Goeree and Yariv (2011).
EUC =
P (Guilty)3H + P (Innocent)L for ConvictionP (Guilty)L+ P (Innocent)H for Acquittal. (1.4)
EUA =
P (Guilty)H + P (Innocent)L for ConvictionP (Guilty)L+ P (Innocent)3H for Acquittal. (1.5)
Equations (1.4) and (1.5) show the modified payoffs, where EUC and EUA are the expected
utility of partisanship for conviction and acquittal, respectively. It follows that a partisan
for conviction is indifferent between conviction and acquittal when P (Guilty) = 0.25 and a
partisan for acquittal is indifferent when P (Guilty) = 0.75. In other words, all jurors vote
for acquittal when P (Guilty) < 0.25, for conviction when P (Guilty) > 0.75, and for their
partisan bias when 0.25 < P (Guilty) < 0.75.
Truthfully reporting one’s signal is not generally an equilibrium in this scenario. Suppose
that Jurors 1 and 2 are both truthful and credulous. Juror 3 is a conviction partisan and is
deciding whether to truthfully report his signal. Suppose that he is able to first observe the
signals reported by Jurors 1 and 2 before sending his own.3 He observes the signals reported
3If Juror 3 could not observe the other jurors’ signals prior to reporting his own, his problem would be
considerably more complex. Reporting a higher signal to mislead those with the opposite bias runs the risk
of misleading those with the same bias, and the juror would need to trade off these competing possibilities
against each other.
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by Jurors 1 and 2 and realizes that P (Guilty|s1, s2, s3) ∈ (0.25, 0.75). If Juror 3 truthfully
reports s3, then all jurors will vote for their partisan bias. This means there is a 25% chance
of an acquittal, since Jurors 1 and 2 each have a 50% chance of being acquittal partisans.
If Juror 3 reports a sufficiently high signal such that P (Guilty|s1, s2, s̃3) > 0.75, he
can guarantee the other two jurors will vote for conviction, raising his expected payoff.
This violates the assumption of truthfulness and gives the other jurors an incentive to
disbelieve the signals that Juror 3 reports. Communication breaks down when preferences
are heterogeneous and uncertain.
1.1.2 Predictions
This simple model of jury behaviour implies several predictions about votes and beliefs
and how they are affected by deliberation. In the experiment, I observed jurors’ beliefs and
votes before and after deliberation in a variety of settings under both aligned and partisan
incentives. The following hypotheses are testable claims implied by the model.
I assume that jurors form beliefs in accordance with the laws of probability (i.e. Bayes’
rule). They were given a known prior probability (always 50% by design) and a signal they
could use to update their belief. When that signal was objective and drawn from a known
probability distribution, this implied a specific posterior belief.
Hypothesis 1. When the evidence permits jurors to arrive at a mathematically correct
belief about the world, they will report that belief.
Jurors should be able to distinguish relevant information that is part of their signal from
irrelevant information that has no relationship to the defendant’s guilt. The experimental
setup included both a meaningful signal and orthogonal information about jurors’ own
payoffs. The model implies that information on the payoff structure should not affect jurors’
beliefs.
Hypothesis 2. Irrelevant information does not affect jurors’ beliefs.
The model assumes that jurors will vote according to their beliefs. Given symmetric
incentives, jurors simply vote according to the outcome they believe is more likely, regardless
of their risk preferences. When incentives are asymmetric (i.e. partisan), risk preferences
can become relevant. Hypothesis 3 assumes risk neutrality over the small stakes of the
experiment.4
Hypothesis 3. Jurors vote for the outcome that maximizes their expected payoff given their
beliefs.
4Rabin (2000) shows that risk aversion over small stakes implies bizarre preferences over large ones. This
study had small stakes, so one should expect rational people to be risk-neutral. While previous laboratory
experiments have indicated that people tend to be risk-averse even over small stakes (Holt and Laury, 2002,
2005), I use risk neutrality as an initial assumption. I discuss alternative assumptions in Section 1.3.
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The model implies that jurors will share their signals truthfully absent partisan
incentives. Moreover, they will update their beliefs to align more closely with those of
the group. Their beliefs will become more accurate (on average) as a result.
Hypothesis 4. When jurors’ incentives are aligned, deliberation causes their beliefs to
update toward those of other jurors. This makes the jurors’ beliefs more accurate on average.
The model predicts that communication will break down when jurors can have conflicting
partisan incentives. Partisan incentives generate an incentive to lie. Jurors can be expected
to recognize this incentive to lie, and so they will not believe one another.
Hypothesis 5. When incentives are not aligned, jurors do not update their beliefs in
response to deliberation.
In order to generalize from theory and laboratory experiments to real-world settings, the
deliberation process must be sufficiently consistent across settings to generate comparable
outcomes. One key difference between past laboratory experiments and the real world is
how people absorb information and form beliefs. The model assumes that the form of signals
is neutral to the deliberation process.
Hypothesis 6. The deliberation process is independent of the form of the signals presented
to jurors.
1.2 Experimental Method
In this section, I discuss the experiment itself, leaving the details of the recruitment,
interface, setup, and debriefing to Section 1.2.3. Figure 1.1 shows the course of the
experiment.
























































































The experimental setup followed the institutional framework established in Section
1.1, with the addition of a pre-deliberation voting round used to establish the effect of
deliberation. Three subjects were grouped together to form an experimental jury, and
this jury was assigned randomly to a treatment. All treatments followed the same general
process. First, the true state of the world was randomly determined. This true state can be
conceptualized as the actual guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant. Next, each juror
viewed evidence relating to this true state. Once the jurors had assessed this evidence, and
prior to any deliberation, they conducted an initial vote. Each juror individually stated their
belief about the true state as a percentage using a slider from 0% to 100%. Next, the jury
entered the deliberation phase, communicating freely through a chatbox for three minutes.
After deliberation, the jurors conducted a second vote and had a second chance to report
their beliefs.
Next, the computer randomly selected one of the four decisions for payment: initial vote,
initial belief, final vote, or final belief. If a vote was selected for payment, the participants
received a high payment ($0.50–1.50 depending on the treatment, explained in Section 1.2.1)
if at least two out of the three participants voted correctly (i.e. to convict the guilty or acquit
the innocent). They received a low payment ($0.10) if at least two voted incorrectly. If a
belief report was selected for payment rather than a vote, payment was based on the Karni
(2009) mechanism, discussed in Section 1.2.2 below.
1.2.1 Treatments
The experiment included five treatments: objective nonpartisan, objective partisan,
subjective nonpartisan, subjective partisan, and framed. Each group was randomly assigned
to one treatment. The treatments affected the form of the evidence delivered to jurors
(objective, subjective, or framed) and the incentive structure (nonpartisan or partisan).
Objective Nonpartisan Treatment In this treatment, the true state of the world was
the colour of an unseen jar. The jurors were informed that the red jar (corresponding to
guilt) contained seven red balls and three blue ones and that the blue jar (corresponding to
innocence) contained seven blue balls and three red ones. Evidence was presented as a single
draw from the jar, with replacement. All three members of a group were shown independent
draws. If most group members voted correctly, all members received the higher payoff of
$1.00.
Objective Partisan Treatment This treatment is identical to the previous one except
for the high payoff. At the start of the experiment, each juror in a group was randomly
and independently assigned as a red or blue partisan with equal probability. If a vote was
selected for payment, and the majority correctly voted for red, red partisans received $1.50,
and blue partisans received $0.50. These payoffs were reversed if the majority correctly
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voted for blue, with blue partisans getting $1.50 and red partisans getting $0.50. As in the
other treatments, everyone received the same low payoff of $0.10 if a majority of the group
voted incorrectly, regardless of their partisan identity.
Subjective Nonpartisan Treatment This treatment adapts an experimental task used
in Caplin and Dean (2015) and Magnani and Oprea (2017). After the true state of the world
was determined (red or blue), jurors were shown a 20 × 20 grid of red and blue balls. If
the true state of the world was red, the grid contained 205 red balls and 195 blue balls.
If the true state of the world was blue, the numbers were reversed. All jurors in a group
were shown the same grid and given 10 seconds to look at it. The payoffs were identical to
those in the objective, nonpartisan treatment: $1 if a vote was selected and the group voted
correctly, regardless of colour.
Subjective Partisan Treatment This treatment combines the grid of balls from the
subjective nonpartisan treatment with the partisan incentives from the objective partisan
treatment. Before viewing the grid, jurors were informed of whether they were a red or
blue partisan and how their payoffs differed as a result. Partisan incentives were identical to
those in the objective partisan treatment: $1.50 if the group correctly voted for the outcome
matching a juror’s partisan leaning, $0.50 if the group correctly voted for the outcome that
did not match the juror’s partisan leaning, and $0.10 if the group voted incorrectly either
way.
Framed Treatment The framed treatment was designed to achieve a higher level of
realism than a traditional experiment. Jurors read the evidence from an actual murder
trial as reported by a journalist who was present in the courtroom. The jurors had up
to 25 minutes to read the evidence, or until all members of the group were finished. As
before, the true state of the world was randomly determined, with an equal probability of a
guilty or innocent defendant. This true state of the world determined which trial the group
read about: one selected from the National Registry of Exonerations (innocent) or one that
resulted in a conviction that was never overturned (guilty).5 The deliberation time in this
treatment was extended from three minutes to five to allow for more discussion.
The payoffs in the framed treatment were the same as in both the nonpartisan
treatments, but with an extra $0.50 bonus for all participants regardless of the outcome to
compensate them for the extra time.
5The details of the selection process for real trials are discussed in Appendix A.1.
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1.2.2 Payoffs and Elicitation
If a belief was selected for payment, the payoffs were determined according to a belief
elicitation based on the Karni (2009) mechanism.6 The mechanism worked in the following
way. Each juror was randomly assigned a percentage from 0% to 100%. Jurors did not know
their own percentages, only that all values from 0% to 100% were equally likely. If their
reported belief in guilt was greater than or equal to their randomly assigned percentage,
the juror received $1 if the defendant was guilty and $0.10 if the defendant was innocent.
Otherwise, they received $1 with a random probability equal to their randomly assigned
percentage and $0.10 otherwise. By reporting a belief of say, 63%, a juror expressed that
they were indifferent between a bet on the defendant’s guilt and a bet they would win with
63% probability. Thus, this mechanism incentivized jurors to truthfully report their beliefs
to maximize their odds of a high payoff.
1.2.3 Recruitment and Online Interface
The experiment was coded in o-Tree (Chen et al., 2016), and the subjects were recruited
via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) through the TurkPrime platform (Litman et al.,
2017). The sample was limited to MTurk users in the United States. Ninety-six groups
of three participants successfully completed the experiment between November 2018 and
March 2019, for a total of 288 participants. All payments were made in USD. Each subject
was paid $2 for completing the experiment in addition to the variable payment determined
by their performance in the experiment.
I opted for MTurk over a laboratory experiment because MTurk allows for larger sample
sizes at a lower cost (Buhrmester et al., 2011). While some have questioned the reliability
of MTurk for experimental research, Snowberg and Yariv (2018) showed that MTurk users
behave similarly to both student populations and a representative sample of Americans. The
study was designed with multiple checks to select attentive subjects and ensure high-quality
responses. Study participation was limited to MTurk users who had completed at least
100 Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) on MTurk with at least a 98% approval rating on
those tasks. Participants joined the experiment through the web interface, read through the
general (non-treatment-specific) instructions, and completed a quiz to test whether they
had read and understood the instructions. If a subject answered a question incorrectly, they
were informed that their answer was wrong and allowed to try again after reviewing the
instructions more carefully. Each participant could make a maximum of 20 mistakes across
all attempts before they were prevented from proceeding. As a result, a respondent who was
answering randomly would be prevented from entering the experiment, while an attentive
person could easily pass the quiz. Once they had answered all the quiz questions correctly,
6This was presented to participants using a narrative about robots borrowed from Coffman (2014).
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the participants were sent to a virtual waiting room until they could be paired with two
other participants to form an experimental jury. These practices build on and exceed the
best practices used by other researchers to ensure engaged responses from study participants
recruited through MTurk (Kennedy et al., 2018).
1.3 Analysis and Results
In this section, I analyze the results of the experiment and revisit the hypotheses laid out
in Section 1.1.2 to assess whether they fit the data.










Participants 72 45 48 39 84
Groups 24 15 16 13 28
Initial correct votes 45 (62.5%) 34 (75.6%) 31 (64.6%) 20 (51.3%) 49 (58.3%)
Final correct votes 47 (65.3%) 37 (82.2%) 32 (66.7%) 26 (66.7%) 57 (67.9%)
Participation fee $2.00 $2.00 $2.00 $2.00 $2.50
Average variable payoff $0.59 $0.82 $0.61 $0.81 $0.59
Average total earnings $2.59 $2.82 $2.61 $2.81 $3.09
Table 1.1 summarizes the size of each treatment, along with the average payoffs and
voting patterns. The remaining results follow the flow of the experiment: first, I discuss the
results related to jurors’ beliefs, then the results related to their voting behaviour, and then
the results related to deliberation.
1.3.1 Beliefs
In the first step of the experiment, participants viewed evidence and formed beliefs.
Result 1. Jurors are not generally good at forming the mathematically correct beliefs
implied by their signals.
In the objective treatments, the signals implied specific probabilities. Jurors were
informed that one of two jars would be selected with equal probability. They were also
told that the red jar contained seven red balls and three blue balls, while the blue jar
contained seven blue balls and three red ones. If this were a mathematics test rather than
an experiment, there would be one correct answer for a juror presented with a red ball: a
70% chance of a red jar. Similarly, a blue ball yields a 30% chance of a red jar.
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Red balls:blue balls 1:0 0:1 3:0 2:1 1:2 0:3
Probability of red jar 0.7 0.3 0.93 0.7 0.3 0.07
Exactly correct 11 10 0 3 5 0
Correct +/- 0.01 11 10 0 3 5 0
Correct +/- 0.05 14 26 1 5 17 4
Correct +/- 0.10 30 29 7 11 22 8
Correct side of 0.50 38 47 17 20 33 22
n 50 67 18 24 48 27
As Table 1.2 shows, most people did not get this correct, falsifying Hypothesis 1. Only
21 out of 117 (17.9%) jurors in these treatments reported a mathematically correct initial
belief, while 59 (50.4%) fell within 10 percentage points. Thirty-two (27.4%) jurors reported
initial beliefs that failed to assign a higher probability to the colour they were shown,
demonstrating considerable confusion. As for post-deliberation beliefs, only eight (6.8%)
jurors reported the exact mathematically correct beliefs given their group’s signals after
deliberation. Only 25 (21.4%) jurors assigned a higher probability to the colour that had
been drawn less in their group.
Fewer jurors reported mathematically precise and correct answers after deliberation,
likely owing to the greater difficulty of calculating probabilities from multiple independent
draws. However, there were also fewer severely confused jurors (whose beliefs fell on the
wrong side of 50%), perhaps owing to guidance from the others in their group.
Result 2. Jurors’ beliefs can be swayed by irrelevant information.
Table 1.3: Effect of partisan bias on beliefs
Dependent variable:
Initial belief Final belief
(1) (2)
Partisan toward conviction 0.162∗∗∗ (0.054) 0.049 (0.063)




Model (1) of Table 1.3 shows how initial beliefs are skewed towards jurors’ partisan
leanings, falsifying Hypothesis 2. If jurors were forming their beliefs in the way implied by
Hypothesis 2, based on their signal and ignoring irrelevant information, then the coefficients
in Model (1) should be
Initial belief = 0(Partisan toward conviction) + 0.5 + ε (1.6)
where ε captures the effect of the signal and is independent of the other terms. Instead,
there was a constant of 0.413, which differs significantly from 0.5 (p = 0.016), and a positive
significant coefficient on partisanship of 0.162. The average guilt partisan had a mean initial
belief of 57.6%, while the average acquittal partisan had a mean initial belief of 41.3%.7
This is surprising, since participants were informed that partisan leanings are random and
independent from the true state. Partisan leanings only affected the potential payoffs from
the voting outcomes and had no impact on the belief elicitation task.
Model (2) of Table 1.3 shows that jurors no longer make this error after they have had
a chance to deliberate. As would be expected of someone rationally responding to signals,
the effect of the irrelevant partisan leaning on beliefs after deliberation is not statistically
different from zero.
1.3.2 Votes
After participants have viewed the evidence and formed beliefs, the next step is to vote on
the outcome.
Result 3. Most jurors vote for the outcome they believe is more likely to be correct regardless
of asymmetric incentives.
Before studying beliefs and belief updating, it is important to check whether beliefs
correspond to voting behaviour. Most people vote for the outcome that they believe is more
likely to be correct, even if the payoffs are asymmetric.
Figure 1.2 shows the relationship between beliefs (both initial and final) and votes. As
the graph shows, the jurors tended to vote for acquittal when their belief in guilt was below
50% and for conviction when their belief was above 50%, regardless of partisan incentives. In
treatments with symmetric incentives, only 20 of 408 (4.9%) votes were inconsistent with this
pattern. Similarly, only 10 of 168 (6.0%) votes in the treatments with asymmetric incentives
were inconsistent with this pattern, even though it would be rational for a risk-neutral juror
to sometimes vote for the less likely outcome.
Hypothesis 3 does not hold because jurors are clearly not adopting the strategy that
maximizes their expected payoffs. Jurors seem to maximize their chance of answering
7Contrast this with the final beliefs, where the mean belief of a guilt partisan was 55.2%, and the mean
belief of an acquittal partisan was 50.4%. This difference is not statistically significant.
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Figure 1.2: Votes by belief in guilt




























Each point represents a belief/vote pair. Jurors’ incentives imply risk-neutral switching points of 25%, 50%,
or 75% depending on the partisanship they were assigned.
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correctly regardless of the relative size of the payoffs. This would be consistent with either
a very high degree of risk aversion (minimizing the chance of receiving the lowest payoff)
or a non-monetary reward for being correct. However, either explanation undermines the
reasoning in Section 1.1.1. If jurors only care about minimizing the odds of being wrong,
partisan incentives are functionally identical to symmetric incentives, and truthful signal
sharing is the optimal strategy in both cases.
1.3.3 Belief updating
After the first vote, the participants deliberate before voting and reporting their beliefs a
second and final time.
Result 4. When incentives are aligned, deliberation causes beliefs to update toward those
of other jurors. This makes beliefs more accurate on average.
Equation (1.3) established how a rational Bayesian would update their beliefs in response
to independent signals. We cannot assume that jurors are Bayesian or that they interpret
their signals as independent, and so I generalize Equation (1.3) by adding weight parameters,
α and β, to each signal as well as a constant term, C (with c ≡ logC).
The logit of some probability x is log[x/(1 − x)]. Juror i’s belief in guilt is modeled as
follows.
P (Guilty|si, sj , sk)











logit[P (Guilty)] =α logit(si) + β[logit(sj) + logit(sk)] + c (1.8)
I refer to logit[P (Guilty)] as the juror’s final belief, logit(si) as juror i’s own prior, and
logit(sj)+logit(sk) as others’ priors. These each correspond to the reported beliefs expressed
as logits. Finally, ε is an error term where E(ε) = 0.
Final Belief = αInitial Belief + βOthers’ Initial Beliefs + c+ ε (1.9)
If the signals are independent and the jurors are Bayesian, then α = β = 1 and c = 0.
This corresponds to giving each signal full and equal weight (α = β = 1) and not being
biased in either direction (c = 0).
Model (1) of Table 1.4 estimates the parameters of Equation (1.9). Model (2) adds
treatment dummies modifying both the constant and the weights shown in Equation 1.10.
Final Belief =(α1Subjective + α2Partisan + α3Framed)α0Initial Belief
+ (β1Subjective + β2Partisan + β3Framed)β0Others’ Initial Beliefs
+ c+ γ1Subjective + γ2Partisan + γ3Framed + ε
(1.10)
16
Model (3) adds a term for the true state of the world (Actual Guilt) to detect when
deliberation picks up accurate information not contained in the initial beliefs. This term
takes a value of 1 when the defendant is guilty (or the true state is red) and 0 otherwise.
This model is given in Equation 1.11.
Final Belief =(α1Subjective + α2Partisan + α3Framed)α0Initial Belief
+ (β1Subjective + β2Partisan + β3Framed)β0Others’ Initial Beliefs
+ (δ1Subjective + δ2Partisan + δ3Framed)δ0Actual Guilt
+ c+ γ1Subjective + γ2Partisan + γ3Framed + ε
(1.11)
Table 1.4: Belief updating model
Final Belief
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.227∗∗ (0.108) −0.001 (0.190) −0.312 (0.246)
Initial Belief 0.698∗∗∗ (0.057) 0.674∗∗∗ (0.118) 0.582∗∗∗ (0.116)
Others’ Initial Beliefs 0.243∗∗∗ (0.037) 0.201∗∗ (0.086) 0.110 (0.087)
Subjective 0.626∗∗ (0.250) 0.694∗∗ (0.333)
Partisan −0.089 (0.250) −0.498 (0.320)
Framed −0.052 (0.315) 0.022 (0.356)
Subjective×Initial Belief 0.141 (0.156) 0.237 (0.151)
Partisan×Initial Belief −0.166 (0.147) −0.159 (0.142)
Framed×Initial Belief 0.128 (0.152) 0.168 (0.149)
Subjective×Others’ Initial Beliefs 0.113 (0.103) 0.209∗∗ (0.101)
Partisan×Others’ Initial Beliefs −0.075 (0.100) −0.068 (0.098)
Framed×Others’ Initial Beliefs 0.110 (0.107) 0.150 (0.108)
Actual Guilt 0.996∗∗ (0.406)
Subjective×Actual Guilt −0.820 (0.515)
Partisan×Actual Guilt 1.191∗∗ (0.506)
Framed×Actual Guilt 0.048 (0.574)
Observations 288 288 288
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The positive and significant weight on the other jurors’ priors shows that the jurors
listened to each other and updated their beliefs to align with those of the group. While the
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jurors were not fully Bayesian, e.g. putting more weight on their own priors than those of
others, they still succeeded at incorporating information from other jurors.
Figure 1.3 shows how deliberation affects the accuracy of beliefs in all treatments,
with two alternative prediction methods for comparison. The naïve Bayesian model
follows Equation (1.3), simply combining all group members’ prior beliefs as if they were
independent signals of guilt. This is achieved by multiplying the odds ratios of all three
jurors’ prior beliefs together to find the final odds ratio.


















Error is defined as the average distance between a belief or prediction and the outcome (1 for true, 0 for
false).
Post-deliberation beliefs outperformed pre-deliberation beliefs in all treatments. This
difference was significant in the objective partisan treatment (p = 0.081), the subjective
partisan treatment (p = 0.099), and in all the treatments pooled together (p = 0.008).
Furthermore, deliberation performs comparably to naïve Bayesian updating. Therefore,
although deliberation does not look like Bayesian updating in Table 1.4, it still pushes
beliefs in the correct direction on average. This is consistent with Hypothesis 4.
Result 5. Jurors cooperate, share their signals, and update their beliefs as if their incentives
were aligned, even when their incentives are not aligned.
Model (2) in Table 1.4 shows no statistical difference between belief updating in the
partisan and non-partisan treatments, falsifying the hypothesis that unaligned incentives
hamper communication (Hypothesis 5). This makes sense in the context of Result 3. Theory
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predicts that jurors will not truthfully share signals because they differ with respect to the
threshold beliefs at which they switch from acquittal to conviction. However, Result 3 shows
that most jurors have a threshold belief of 50% regardless of asymmetric incentives. Given
that they share the same threshold, jurors have nothing to lose by truthfully sharing their
signals.
This is consistent with the excessive truthfulness observed by Goeree and Yariv (2011)
in their partisan treatments. In that experiment, jurors tended to truthfully share their
signals even when theory predicted they would not.
Result 6. Deliberation happens the same way regardless of the form of signals presented to
jurors.
Model (2) of Table 1.4 also shows that, with one exception, there are no significant
differences in belief updating between the objective, subjective, and framed treatments.8 The
insignificant terms on the treatment dummies and their interactions show that treatment
differences are not an important factor in belief updating. The regression results suggest
that given three people with a set of initial beliefs, their deliberation will lead to a similar
outcome whether they are deliberating over a murder case or an abstract question involving
red and blue balls. The form of information does not seem to matter when it comes to belief
updating under deliberation. This is consistent with Hypothesis 6.
Result 7. Deliberation corrects the impact of irrelevant information.
Two unexpected results stand out in the data: First, as shown in Figure 1.3, belief
accuracy improved the most in partisan treatments. Second, Model (3) of Table 1.4 shows
significant positive coefficients on Actual Guilt and the interaction term Partisan×Actual
Guilt. This means that people updated their beliefs in the correct direction more than
expected based on the beliefs in their group. This effect was stronger in partisan treatments,
which featured the largest improvements in beliefs after deliberation.
Table 1.3 shows the results of two regressions: initial beliefs and final beliefs regressed
on partisan incentives. The jurors were informed that their partisan leanings were randomly
determined and independent of the true outcome. Nevertheless, their pre-deliberation beliefs
were significantly swayed in the direction of their partisan leaning. This bias was corrected
with deliberation; there was no significant impact of partisan leanings on post-deliberation
beliefs.
This could be considered an instance of self-serving bias; partisan jurors stood to gain
more in one scenario, and so they were biased toward seeing that scenario as more likely
(see Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005). Alternatively, one could view it as a simple error.
8The one exception is a statistically significant bias in favour of updating toward the colour red in the
subjective treatments. This result was unexpected, as I know of no theoretical reason to expect red and blue
to be different.
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Jurors were given a piece of information (their partisan bias) that some misinterpreted as
a signal. In either case, their group members were able to correct their error, leading to an
improvement in prediction accuracy.
1.4 Conclusion
This study makes two contributions to the study of deliberation. First, by adding belief
elicitation to the experimental study of deliberation, the study adds insights into how
people change their beliefs when they deliberate. Second, adapting the experiment to various
settings shows that this type of experiment is robust concerning the form of information
presented to jurors. Although the subjects’ heuristic approach sometimes diverged from
theory, it was at least consistent across different settings.
The results of the belief elicitation offer a potential answer to an apparent contradiction
raised in the literature. Theoretical work by Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) shows that
jurors with misaligned preferences have an incentive to lie. In contrast, this experiment finds
no evidence of lying, consistent with past experiments (Goeree and Yariv, 2011; Le Quement
and Marcin, 2020). A potential clue lies in the relationship between beliefs and votes. Jurors
nearly always voted for the outcome they viewed as more likely, even if that outcome had a
significantly lower upside payoff. This is consistent with the pattern Le Quement and Marcin
(2020) found, wherein 80% of subjects adopted a heuristic of sharing their information and
then voting for whichever outcome had the most evidence in its favour. It appears that
part of the heuristic approach to deliberation is to always vote for the more likely outcome,
not for the highest expected value. If all members of a jury behave this way, it violates
the assumption of a minimally diverse committee, meaning a committee with a difference
in decision thresholds. Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) proved that full truth-telling
under a unanimity rule is not an equilibrium if and only if the committee is minimally
diverse. Thus, the finding that the vast majority of jurors functionally have the same voting
threshold is sufficient to explain why they tend to share their private signals truthfully.
This study’s novel use of both a subjective task and a framed experiment for deliberation
research has shown that neither subjectivity nor framing changes how people update their
beliefs when deliberating.9 This supports the external validity of the laboratory experiments
in this area. All deliberation experiments rely on the assumption of similarity between the
laboratory setting and the real-life settings where consequential deliberative decisions are
made. In this case, the assumption holds.
This experiment unintentionally produced an opportunity for subjects to demonstrate
motivated beliefs. Researchers have demonstrated that people form and hold motivated
beliefs in a wide range of real-world and experimental settings (see Bénabou, 2015). In the
9With one exception: see footnote 8.
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partisan treatments, subjects with a financial stake in one particular outcome believed that
outcome was more likely even though the outcome was random and independent of their
incentives (see Result 2). Intriguingly, this effect disappeared after the communication phase.
Charness et al. (2018) demonstrates that there may be a strategic element to overconfident
or motivated beliefs. People may self-deceive in order to be more convincing to others,
correcting this after deliberation has already happened and there is no longer the possibility
of deception. Alternatively, subjects may have simply conflated their partisan bias with a
signal, correcting this error after discussing it with others. Further research could help to
explore whether group discussion consistently corrects motivated and overconfident beliefs
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2.1 Introduction
Experiments start by providing instructions designed to ensure that subjects understand
how their actions and others’ actions determine payoffs. Such understanding is crucial
to the economic interpretation of subjects’ behaviour – without it, the experimenter has
lost control (Smith, 1982). Almost from the field’s inception, experimental economists
have recognized that the effectiveness of instructions in establishing understanding may
depend on how they are delivered and reinforced (Fouraker and Siegel 1963). Prominent
textbooks give detailed guidelines on how to deliver instructions and suggest complementary
methods to increase subjects’ comprehension, including reading instructions aloud and
using demonstrations, quizzes, and practice rounds (Friedman and Sunder 1994, Davis and
Holt 1993, Cassar and Friedman 2004). Casual observation suggests wide variation in how
practitioners deliver instructions and use reinforcement methods. We review the methods for
delivering and reinforcing instructions as reported in experimental studies recently published
in six leading journals and confirm this observation. We find that almost all experimenters
complement their instructions with at least one reinforcement method, though the methods
used vary substantially. This suggests that experimental economics lacks clear norms for how
instructions ought to be delivered and reinforced. Troublingly, we were unable to classify
roughly 22% of papers because they failed to provide sufficient details on their methods.
Despite observed variation in practices, there is scant evidence comparing their
effectiveness. Thus we conduct an experiment to evaluate the impact of methods of delivering
instructions and reinforcing their content on behaviour. We study a one-shot timing decision
in which each subject is performing a default Task 1 for money and must decide when (or
whether) to switch over and complete Task 2. Task 2 can be performed at most once,
and the subject is paid the most for doing it at the correct time and least for doing
it earlier. Moreover, the subject is better off not doing Task 2 at all than doing it too
early. This information is explicitly stated in the instructions. Doing the task too early –
non money-maximizing behaviour (NMB) – could reflect idiosyncratic preferences, or result
from a failure to comprehend or retain information from the instructions. Variation in NMB
across treatments, which hold the distribution of preferences constant in expectation, thus
reflects variation in comprehension and retention. For most treatments, we hold constant the
content of instructions and vary how instructions are delivered and reinforced. We include
one additional treatment with enhanced instructions as a robustness check.
In our first treatment subjects complete self-paced computerized instructions including
practice rounds and then take a comprehension quiz before beginning the study (providing
us an alternative measure of their comprehension upon completion of the instructions).
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Nearly half of subjects in this treatment do the task too early, exhibiting NMB. A second
treatment provides subjects with the quiz answers, and this generates a moderate, but
statistically insignificant reduction in NMB. We thus study the additional impact of
introducing monetary incentives for quiz performance, of going through the computerized
instructions twice (both before and after the quiz), and of providing paper instructions
alongside computerized instructions. We find that all three of these treatments lead to
significant improvements relative to the baseline – but each only eliminates about half of
the observed NMB, as does our treatment with enhanced instructions.
By studying an individual decision task, our experiment eliminates strategic and
other-regarding motives that might confound the identification or interpretation of NMB. By
studying a one-shot decision without feedback, we obtain a clean measure of understanding
and retention of the instructions that is not confounded by learning. We are aware of two
existing papers that have studied the impact of instruction delivery and reinforcement on
play in repeated public goods games (Bigoni and Dragone, 2012; Ramalingam et al., 2018).1
The more relevant of these is Bigoni and Dragone (2012), who find that shortened on-screen
instructions led to lower quiz scores and longer response times as compared to their baseline
paper instructions, shortened paper instructions, and shortened on-screen instructions with
active examples requiring subject input. However, they find no effect of instructions on
observed behaviour.
2.2 Literature Survey
We report how instructions are delivered and reinforced in 260 experimental studies
published between January 2011 and December 2016 in Experimental Economics and five
prominent general interest economics journals. We selected all papers in these journals that
contained at least one lab experiment in which participants were given instructions on the
experimental procedure. For each paper, we checked whether instructions were delivered on
paper, on screen, both, or neither. We also recorded the use of various practices intended
to reinforce the content of the instructions, including reading the instructions aloud,
demonstrations, practice rounds, and pre-experiment quizzes. Since ensuring subjects’ initial
comprehension may be particularly important when experiments are one-shot or provide
limited feedback, we further classified the nature of each experiment based on whether or
not a main task was one-shot, and whether or not subjects received feedback. This allows
us to assess whether experimenters adapt their instruction protocols to the nature of the
1Our discussion here is restricted to instruction delivery and reinforcement. We have little to say about
how variation in the content of the instructions may affect behaviour, by providing or failing to provide
subjects with payoff-relevant information, or alternatively by influencing the framing of the experimental
task. See Alekseev et al. (2017) for a discussion of the use of context in instructions. See also Converse
and Presser (1986) for a discussion of effective survey design which offers potentially useful guidance for
economists.
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task being studied. Details of our classification procedure are given in Appendix A. The
results of our survey are given in Table 2.1.
We were unable to determine how instructions were delivered in 22% of the studies
we reviewed. If behaviour is sensitive to how instructions are delivered, this oversight
hampers replication. Of the remaining 204 studies, 61% deliver instructions exclusively
on paper, 24% deliver instructions exclusively on screen, while another 5% use both. We
find this noteworthy since the majority of these experiments are themselves computerized.
The remaining 10% of these 204 studies use neither paper nor computer instructions. Most
such studies are lab-in-the-field experiments studying non-student populations and deliver
instructions orally along with some of the reinforcement methods discussed below. We
suspect that experimental economists’ revealed preference for paper instructions is driven
by the fact that subjects can refer back to them throughout the experiment, which may
not always be the case with computer instructions. This may mitigate subjects’ tendency
to forget important information.2
85% of all studies use at least one method of reinforcement which suggests that
experimenters are almost universally concerned about subject comprehension and retention.
Instructions are read aloud in 54% of studies. We find that 57% of studies use demonstrations
or practice rounds to reinforce subject understanding of the experiment. Examples of such
practices include physical demonstrations of how risk will be resolved,3 guided examples of
possible actions and their consequent outcomes, and unpaid practice rounds. Of the studies
that use at least one of these forms of reinforcement, 80% use guided demonstrations or
guided practice rounds, and 42% use unguided practice rounds; some studies use both.
In addition to reinforcing the content of instructions, experiments can also test subjects’
comprehension thereof with pre-experiment quizzes (39% of studies). At least 63% of these
reinforced understandings and corrected misunderstandings by providing answers to the
quiz, and 41% required a perfect score to commence the experiment. Only three of the
studies paid subjects for quiz performance. We note that 35% of studies that used a quiz
did not clearly report whether or how subjects were given feedback on the quiz.
Given our prior that reinforcement may be especially important when feedback is limited,
we find it surprising that one-shot experiments less frequently incorporate practice or
demonstrations (ρ = −.19, p < .01, n = 260) and quizzes (ρ = −.15, p = .02, n = 260) in
their instructions; see Appendix A for more detail.
Our survey reveals wide variation in how experimenters deliver and reinforce
instructions. Nevertheless, there are commonalities which seem to reflect some notion
2Reading instructions aloud and/or publicly distributing paper instructions may also help establish
common information in strategic settings (Friedman and Sunder 1994, p. 77).
3Davis and Holt (1993, p. 23) and Friedman and Sunder (1994 p. 67) suggest that the use of physical
























































































































































































































































































































of ‘best practices.’ Few studies have tested whether current practices are effective – our
experiment is designed to fill this gap.
2.3 Experimental Design
2.3.1 Overview of Experiment
We design a one-shot, individual choice experiment in which each subject performs two
tasks, a base task which provides a low flow of payoffs throughout the experiment, and a
second task which can only be completed once and results in a potentially large lump-sum
payoff. The amount of the lump sum depends on the time at which they initiate the second
task. Doing the second task too early results in a lower payoff than doing it at the right
time (or not doing it at all).
Task 1 is the Poodle Jump game (based on a popular mobile game Doodle Jump), where
players guide a bouncing poodle up a series of platforms by pressing two buttons. When
a subject misses a platform, the poodle falls to the ground and the game restarts with
no penalty. Each participant receives $0.25 per period of Task 1, so long as they jump a
minimum cumulative height. This height was chosen so that it would be trivially easy to
complete but not automatic – effectively guaranteeing an attentive subject this payment
each period.4
Task 2 is a simplified version of the slider task (Gill and Prowse, 2012). Players can
switch from Task 1 to Task 2 at any time by pressing the ‘j’ key, but they can only do this
once. In the slider task, players are presented with four sliders which can be moved from
zero to 100. The task is successfully completed when all four sliders are dragged to 50 and
the player clicks “Continue.”5 Task 2’s payoff depends on when the subject presses ‘j’. For
the first 21 periods, each period being one minute long, it pays $0.20. However, in period 22
it jumps to $7, falling to $4 in period 23, then dropping by $0.50 in every period thereafter
until period 30 when the experiment ends. These payoffs are demonstrated in Figure 2.1.
Doing Task 2 in period 22 maximizes a subject’s payoff; whereas, doing it before period 22
minimizes a subject’s payoff. If a subject fails to do Task 2 in period 22, they would always
earn higher payoffs by doing it as soon as possible thereafter.
The challenge for subjects is to recognize and remember the correct time to press the
‘j’ key to complete Task 2, given the attention required to successfully complete Task 1
in each period. However, subjects have strong incentive to complete Task 2 at the right
time: doing Task 2 at the right time raises payoffs by $6.75 relative to not doing it at all,
and by a minimum of $3 compared to completing it at any other time. Moreover, doing it
4Only 5 out of 308 subjects ever failed to attain the required height in a period; 4 did so once and one
subject did so twice. These failures account for only 0.1% of all Poodle Jump periods.
5Only one subject started but failed to complete the slider task.
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Figure 2.1: Screenshot showing how payoffs were described to subjects
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Table 2.2: Summary of treatments
Treatment Quiz Answers Additional Reinforcement # ofSubjects
NO QUIZ No No No 43
QUIZ Yes No No 76
ANSWERS Yes Yes No 36
INCENTIVE Yes Yes Pay 0.50 CAD per correct quiz answer 38
TWICE Yes Yes Instructions restarted unexpectedly 38
PAPER Yes Yes Instructions duplicated in paper printout 40
ENHANCED Yes No Only through enhanced on-screen instructions 37
before period 22 leads the subject to forgo the opportunity to do it at the optimal period
or thereafter, and also results in a lower payoff than never doing Task 2. Thus, doing Task
2 before period 22 precludes the subject from maximizing their monetary payoffs. We use
the NMB acronym to refer to such behaviour below.
NMB can thus reveal that a subject failed to comprehend or retain a particularly key
piece of payoff-relevant information from the instructions.6 As hinted at earlier, our design
restricts the set of possible preference-based explanations for NMB. Moreover, since we
sample subjects from the same distribution of preferences in each treatment, variation in
NMB across treatments identifies changes in comprehension and retention.
2.3.2 Treatment Design
We employ a between-subjects design with seven treatments. We study the effectiveness of
different ways of delivering and reinforcing the experiment’s instructions on NMB using
our aforementioned measure. Many experimenters implicitly assume that subjects fully
understand their instructions. If this is true, we should not observe any difference between
treatments. However, if subjects do not always comprehend or retain information from the
instructions there is the potential for variation in delivery and additional reinforcement to
reduce NMB. Our treatments test the impact of various more-or-less standard procedures
employed by experimenters to improve comprehension and retention. All treatments are
summarized in Table 2.2. All treatments started with a common set of self-paced on-screen
instructions, which included a graphical explanation of payoffs as well as reinforcement from
practice rounds for both tasks and practice switching between tasks.
The NO QUIZ treatment presents the instructions on screen with no additional
reinforcement. The NO QUIZ treatment gives us information on NMB when subjects read
instructions on their own.
6We note that neither a subject who understood and retained this information but simply forgot to switch
nor a subject who (for whatever reason) did not understand this information but only switched at or after
period 22 would be coded as exhibiting NMB by this measure.
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The QUIZ treatment was identical to the NO QUIZ except that each subject completed
a six question comprehension quiz on paper at the end of the on-screen instructions; subjects
were informed that there would be a quiz prior to beginning the instructions, but no feedback
was given on the quiz. The QUIZ treatment allows us to assess whether the presence of the
quiz affects NMB, and the quiz itself gives a secondary measure of comprehension. When
we analyze our data, we use this as our baseline treatment for comparison to the other
treatments below.
The ANSWERS treatment was identical to the QUIZ treatment, except that subjects
were presented the answers to the quiz orally after all had completed it. This corrected
possible misunderstandings revealed in quiz answers and reinforced key pieces of information
from the instructions. As noted by Cassar and Friedman (2004), a quiz is a good way to
“make sure that the subjects understand the rules” (p. 71); thus we expect providing the
answers to the quiz will correct failures of comprehension or retention and reduce NMB.
The TWICE treatment was identical to the ANSWERS treatment except that after
completing the quiz and answers, the experimenter unexpectedly restarted the instructions
for the participants to work through a second time. This allowed subjects to further review
any content they missed on the first go and provided additional reinforcement. As noted by
Friedman and Sunder (1994), “[when] a subject does not seem to understand the instructions
[...] the experimenter may reread the relevant part of the instructions or go through an
example” (p. 77). Repeating the instructions TWICE achieves both of these objectives and
thus should reduce NMB.
The INCENTIVE treatment was identical to the ANSWERS treatment except that
subjects were paid $0.50 for each correct quiz answer, and were informed of this before
starting the instructions. We hypothesized that this would lead subjects to pay more
attention to the material in the instructions, and make any mistakes from the quiz more
salient, thereby improving understanding. Pay for performance is standard in experimental
economics because economists believe it motivates subjects to think carefully and participate
actively in experiments (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). By paying for performance on the
quiz, we anticipate that subjects will exert more effort in carefully reading the instructions,
thereby reducing NMB.
The PAPER treatment was identical to the ANSWERS treatment except that the
experimenter also distributed paper printouts of the instructions (in addition to the
on-screen instructions), which participants could keep and reference at any time, even while
completing the quiz.7 We thus expect PAPER to improve comprehension as measured by
quiz scores and reduce NMB both for this reason, and through improving retention given
the quiz score since written instructions are available throughout the session.
7The PAPER treatment potentially reduces forgetfulness since all relevant information is accessible
throughout the experiment.
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The ENHANCED treatment was identical to the QUIZ treatment but with enhanced
on-screen instructions.8 Compared to the other treatments, the on-screen instructions were
lengthened from five to seven screens in length. In these enhanced instructions, Figure 2.1
appeared four times (instead of only once), and subjects were presented with four worked-out
examples that explained the payoff that would result from different possible switching times.
Unlike in our other treatments, the last page of the enhanced instructions included Figure
2.1, and each subject waited on that page while other subjects completed the instructions
and while they completed the quiz. With the benefit of hindsight, we emphasized the details
we knew past subjects had failed to grasp. This treatment is also consistent with the advice
of Friedman and Sunder (1994), applied between-subjects, and we expect the ENHANCED
instructions to similarly reduce NMB.
For reasons explained above, we hypothesize that each additional form of reinforcement
reduces NMB. Specifically, we conjectured that having a QUIZ would have a similar level
of NMB as NO QUIZ, but relative to these treatments, ANSWERS would reduce NMB,
each of our remaining interventions on top of that (INCENTIVE, TWICE, and PAPER)
would further reduce NMB, and ENHANCED would also reduce NMB relative to QUIZ.
We hypothesized that higher quiz scores will be associated with lower rates of NMB, and
that in the INCENTIVE, PAPER, and ENHANCED treatments most or all reductions in
NMB are reflected in higher quiz scores, while the ANSWERS and TWICE treatments
reduce NMB given quiz scores.
Our experiment differs from existing studies on instructions in two regards. First, this
is an individual decision task, so there is neither complexity from strategic behaviour nor
other-regarding concerns. Second, it is a one-shot task – each subject can only press ‘j’
once – so participants who fail to understand the instructions cannot learn through trial
and error. These features allow us to cleanly identify NMB and attribute variation in NMB
to variation in the delivery and reinforcement of instructions. Nonetheless, we believe that
our experiment provides a good analogy to other experiments, particularly those where a
decision of interest is only one of multiple decisions the subject makes. We also conjecture
that more complicated experiments face at least as much risk of misunderstanding as exists
in our simple experiment (even if most existing experiments are unable to diagnose it).
2.3.3 Procedures
Upon entering the lab, the experimenter assigned participants to visually isolated computer
terminals. Participants were told not to interact with one another for the duration of the
experiment. In all treatments, participants were informed that they would be given a set
of instructions followed by an experiment in which they could potentially earn a significant
amount of money; in the treatments with a quiz, they were also informed that there would be
8The ENHANCED treatment was added later on a suggestion from the editor.
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a quiz at the end of the instructions; subjects in the INCENTIVE treatment were informed
that they would be paid for their quiz performance above and beyond their earnings from
the experiment. The experimenter then started the self-paced on-screen instructions which
included a written description of the tasks and the payoff structure, practice rounds of both
tasks, practice switching between tasks, and a graphical illustration of the payoffs to both
tasks in each period (a full copy of the instructions are presented in Appendix B). Once all
participants completed the instructions, the experimenter distributed the quiz in the QUIZ,
ANSWERS, INCENTIVE, TWICE, PAPER, and ENHANCED treatments; the correct
answers were revealed after all participants had completed the quiz except in the QUIZ
and ENHANCED treatments. In the TWICE treatment, subjects completed the on-screen
instructions a second time, including practice rounds. Then the experiment started. At the
end of some sessions, we conducted a post-experiment questionnaire (Appendix D).9
We recruited 308 participants to 45 sessions through Simon Fraser University’s CRABE
recruiting system, with no subject participating in more than one session. Each session lasted
under an hour. Average earnings were 18.37 CAD including a 7 CAD show-up payment. We
collected no other demographic data nor other behavioural measures.
2.4 Results
We use a subject’s decision to do Task 2 at any time before period 22 as NMB, which is
our behavioural measure of their failure to pay attention to, comprehend, absorb, or retain
information from the instructions. Table 2.3 shows the share of NMB by treatment. All
p-values reported below are two-sided.
Finding 1: NMB is prevalent.
In our NO QUIZ and QUIZ treatments, 44% and 47% of subjects exhibited NMB by
doing Task 2 before period 22. This is despite the fact that these treatments include
both demonstrations and practice periods. Even in our most effective treatment, the
corresponding share is 18%. These findings suggest that failures to comprehend or retain
information from instructions may be an important source of noise.10 This justifies concern
about the effectiveness of instruction delivery and reinforcement methods.
Finding 2: Combining reinforcement methods reduces NMB.
We find that additional reinforcement reduces NMB: we reject the joint hypothesis that
NMB occurs at the same rate across all treatments (Fisher’s exact test, p < .01, n = 308).
9We have responses from 72 subjects because this was added at the suggestion of a referee.
10In Appendix C, we show that we find similar results if we account for trembles by defining NMB based

















































































































































































































































































Compared to NO QUIZ and QUIZ, we observe somewhat less NMB in the ANSWERS
treatment (33%), but we do not detect any statistically significant differences between
these treatments (Fisher’s exact test of equal NMB rates across these treatments, p = .35,
n =155). In each of the INCENTIVE (24%), TWICE (18%), and PAPER (23%) treatments
that provide additional reinforcement, subjects exhibited significantly less NMB than in the
QUIZ treatment (Fisher’s exact tests, p < .02, .01, .01, n = 114, 114, 116 respectively). While
the ENHANCED treatment (22%) reduces NMB (Fisher’s exact test, p = .01, n = 113), it
does not eliminate it.11 Our findings suggest that more detailed instructions and extensive
reinforcement each improve comprehension and retention of the instructions.
Finding 3: Lower quiz scores are associated with NMB. Providing quiz answers
while also making incorrect answers salient can reduce NMB among lower
performers.
Quiz scores provide an alternative measure of subject comprehension immediately after
the instructions. In the QUIZ treatment which provides neither feedback nor additional
reinforcement, quiz score and NMB are negatively related (Goodman-Kruskal γ, p < 0.01,
n = 76); indeed 13 of 76 subjects had a perfect score on the quiz, and none of them
subsequently exhibited NMB in the experiment. In fact, across all of our treatments we
find it striking that only one of the 73 people with a perfect quiz score exhibited NMB.12
This indicates that full comprehension at the completion of the instructions appears to be a
sufficient condition for avoiding NMB in our experiment and that retention is a second-order
issue.
Our quiz score data enable us to test whether the INCENTIVE, PAPER, and
ENHANCED treatments improved subjects’ comprehension as demonstrated on the quiz,
compared to the pooled distribution of quiz scores from the QUIZ, ANSWERS, and
TWICE treatments, which followed identical procedures up to the collection of the quiz.13
Average quiz scores by treatment are reported in Table 2.3. To our surprise, neither the
INCENTIVE nor the ENHANCED treatment significantly improved quiz scores (rank-sum
tests, p = .59, .14, n = 188, 187, respectively). The PAPER treatment, which made the
answers accessible to subjects during the quiz, improved scores significantly (rank-sum test,
11We cannot reject the hypothesis INCENTIVE, TWICE, PAPER, and ENHANCED lead to similar
improvements (Fisher’s exact test of no association, p = .96, n = 153).
12One person with a perfect quiz score in the TWICE treatment switched 28 seconds too early.
13We find no significant differences in the distribution of quiz scores in the QUIZ, ANSWER, and TWICE
treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = .15, n = 150).
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Table 2.4: Treatment effects on Non Money-maximizing behaviour and Quiz Scores
Dependent variable Mediation analysis
NMB Quiz Score NMB
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NO QUIZ -0.128 n
(-0.889, 0.632)
ANSWERS -0.588 0.051 -0.050 -0.138
112(-1.424, 0.248) (-2.884, 2.987) (-0.586, 0.487) (-0.308, 0.048)ANSWERS × Quiz Score -0.206 0.00715
(-0.941, 0.528) (-0.069, 0.085)
INCENTIVE -1.065** -2.531* 0.211 -0.219
114(-1.948, -0.182) (-5.332, 0.271) (-0.354, 0.775) (-0.392, -0.030)INCENTIVE × Quiz Score 0.361 -0.028
(-0.257, 0.978) (-0.111, 0.049)
TWICE -1.383*** -2.181 0.421 -0.255***
114(-2.329, -0.436) (-5.235, 0.873) (-0.156, 0.998) (-0.425, -0.065)TWICE × Quiz Score 0.207 -0.057
(-0.467, 0.880) (-0.145, 0.021)
PAPER -1.131** 7.334* 1.320*** 0.134
116(-2.009, -0.253) (-0.810, 15.478) (0.922, 1.718) (-0.189, 0.343)PAPER × Quiz Score -1.485* -0.177***
(-2.970, 0.001) (-0.273, -0.085)
ENHANCED -1.182** -0.557 0.489* -0.188*
113(-2.096, -0.269) (-4.596, 3.482) (-0.030, 1.008) (-0.382, 0.013)ENHANCED × Quiz Score -0.116 -0.067*
(-0.993, 0.760) (-0.151, 0.004)
Quiz Score -0.679***
(-1.053, -0.306)
Intercept -0.105 2.683*** 4.105***
(-0.561, 0.350) (0.993, 4.374) (3.789, 4.422)
Observations 308 265 265
QUIZ is the omitted category. *, **, and *** respectively denote p < .1, p < .05, p < .01. Robust (HC1) 95%
confidence intervals are in parentheses in Columns (1)-(4). Mediation column reports estimated “direct effects” in
the row of a treatment dummy, and mediated effects in the row of the interaction term between Quiz Score and that
treatment dummy, both evaluated relative to the QUIZ baseline. That is, the direct effect of a treatment corresponds
to E[NMB|Treatment,Quiz Score = 4.1]− E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1], while the mediated effect
corresponds to E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = E[Quiz Score|Treatment]]− E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1].
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p < 0.01, n = 190), and the linear regression in Table 2.4, column 3 shows that PAPER
had the largest effect on quiz score of all of our treatments.14
Quiz score data also allow us to further assess how our treatments reduce NMB.
Goodman-Kruskal γ tests revealed that quiz score had a significant (p < .05 in each
test, n = 76, 36, 38, 40, 37 respectively for each of QUIZ, ANSWERS, TWICE, PAPER,
and ENHANCED) negative relationship with NMB in each treatment except INCENTIVE
(where p = .054, n = 38) and NO QUIZ (where scores were not available). To decompose
the extent to which treatment effects operate via (i.e. are mediated through) improved
comprehension demonstrated on the quiz, we perform mediation analysis (applying the
approach of Imai et al. 2010) in column 4 of Table 2.4, based on a model of NMB as a
logistic-linear function of quiz score, treatment, and their interactions (column 2), and a
linear regression to model treatment effects on quiz scores (column 3). The INCENTIVE
and TWICE treatments have sizable and significant direct effects but insignificant and small
mediated effects.15 This indicates that these treatments primarily reduce NMB by clearing
up (TWICE) and making salient (INCENTIVE) failures of comprehension demonstrated on
the quiz. In contrast, the PAPER treatment has the largest mediated effect of all treatments,
which is statistically significant, but only a small and insignificant direct effect beyond that.
Mediated and direct effects of the ENHANCED treatment are each borderline insignificant,
indicating a mix of both types of effects, but point estimates indicate a larger direct effect.
Robustness Checks Figure 2.2 shows empirical CDFs of completion times for Task 2,
by treatment. For robustness, we show in Appendix C that we would arrive at similar
qualitative conclusions to those reported in Table 2.4 using any of three alternative measures
of NMB which vary the strictness of the criteria by which we classify behaviour as NMB.
Our post-experiment questionnaire was only partially able to diagnose causes of NMB in
our experiment (see Appendix D for a full analysis). While subjects’ responses are correlated
with behaviour and quiz scores, they fail to provide any indication of the differences between
the QUIZ and ENHANCED treatments in NMB revealed in the experiment.
2.5 Discussion
Our experiments indicate that even when using combinations of reinforcement methods
including demonstrations, practice periods, and a quiz, many subjects’ behaviour reveals
that they fail to pay attention to, understand, or retain information from the instructions.
Combining these with further reinforcement methods reduced NMB, as did increasing the
14The positive effect of paper instructions on quiz performance is consistent with the evidence reported
in Bigoni and Dragone (2012).
15In the case of TWICE, this is reassuring since any mediated effect can only arise due to sampling
variation.
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level of detail in the instructions. Each of these methods leads to a similar improvement
but does not eliminate NMB.
In our setting, we feel confident attributing variation in the anomalous behaviour that
we observe to a variation in the failure to understand or absorb the instructions. In
other experiments designed to test for anomalous behaviour, the distinction between truly
anomalous behaviour of interest and a failure to understand the instructions may not be so
clearcut. This justifies a concern with how instructions are given and the use of behavioural
checks of understanding. Our findings broadly suggest that experimenters’ attempts to
reinforce the instructions or make them more salient can be effective at reducing NMB.
Note that though we are able to reduce NMB in our design, some residual NMB persists
even in the best case. While the extent of such NMB is likely to vary with experimental
context (e.g. subject pool, design, feedback), its presence is noteworthy and has implications
for the power and interpretation of experimental tests.
Finally, our findings motivate advice on how to report and deliver instructions. First,
experimenters should be aware that the way instructions are delivered and reinforced has
consequences for behaviour. Second, we suggest providing paper instructions when possible,
since this requires no extra lab time, is almost free, and is about as effective in reducing NMB
in our experiment as other reinforcement methods. Third, we suggest that all experimental
papers should clearly report how they deliver and reinforce instructions, as this can be
crucial for close replication and interpretation.16 Journals’ efforts to require experimenters
to share copies of their instructions are laudable, and these could be complemented by
standardized reporting of how instructions are delivered and reinforced.
16For example, recent work by Chen et al. (2018) demonstrates, via new experiments following different




Mobility as a Service Apps and
Multimodal Transportation:
Evidence From a Multimodal App
Hao Li, Garrett M. Petersen, and Fei Yu
Abstract
Recent years have featured rapid innovation in digital platforms connecting users
with transportation services. Aggregator apps and Mobility as a Service (MaaS)
platforms offer users the convenience of accessing multiple different services
through a single app. These apps offer end-to-end route planning combining
and comparing multiple different modes of transport. Some transit authorities
have bet on these apps as a means to promote transit usage by encouraging ride
hailing as an extension to fixed-route, fixed-schedule transit lines. Using data
from a popular aggregator app, we test whether a multimodal route-planning
service caused users to use combined routes featuring both ride hailing and
transit. We find that ride-hailing trips connected with rail stops increased from
3.0% of trips to 5.5% among existing users. In areas where the feature supported
bus connections, trips connecting to bus stops increased from 4.6% to 8.7%
among existing users. Our results indicate that aggregators increase the degree
of complementarity between ride hailing and transit.
The 21st century has seen rapid innovation in digital platforms for transportation.
Starting in 2005 with the development of the General Transit Specification Feed (GTFS),
transit agencies around the world have released open source information on their routes
and vehicles. This has allowed mapping applications such as Google Maps to help users
plan transit trips with accurate, up-to-date information. With the development of modern
smartphones, beginning with the first iPhone in 2007, users could have transit information
anywhere, any time through one of many mapping applications connected to GTFS feeds.
39
Once smartphones became ubiquitous, new platforms emerged to allow users to summon a
vehicle through their phones. Ride hailing platforms Uber and Lyft both launched in San
Francisco in 2010, and have emerged as major competitors to the taxi industry by connecting
drivers with passengers through digital platforms. Others followed, with entrants to the
space creating digital platforms for users to locate and rent other vehicles such as bicycles
and scooters, as well as vans and larger vehicles offering shared service (i.e. “microtransit”).
With a wide array of mobility services scattered across different platforms, a natural
development was the creation of aggregator apps that could combine multiple forms of
mobility operated by different organizations. With an aggregator app, users can easily
compare all available modes of travel and pick the combination of speed, convenience,
and cost that they prefer. If no one mode of travel is best, the app can help users plan
a multimodal route involving multiple services. This is particularly useful for combining
the efficiency and low cost of mass transit with the flexibility of a car by linking transit
and ride hailing trips together. These aggregators are the most basic form of Mobility as a
Service (MaaS), digital platforms combining multiple transportation services with the goal
of competing with private cars. Transit agencies have taken notice of this development,
and some are betting big on MaaS as a means to promote transit by extending the range of
fixed-route, fixed-schedule transit lines (Goodall et al., 2017). To compete with the flexibility
of private cars, MaaS needs to offer a convenient means of getting anywhere a car can go.
Multimodal trips fill a niche by facilitating trips that are not well-served by transit or ride
hailing alone, making them an important part of the MaaS ecosystem.
We study whether the integration of different modes of transport within an aggregator
app can promote the use of ride hailing as a first- and last-mile solution for transit. A
popular mapping app added a multimodal route planning feature in November 2018, with
bus connections supported in select cities and rail connections supported everywhere. We
observe the change in multimodal behaviour by measuring the change in the proportion of
ride hailing trips starting or ending at transit stops. We find that this feature significantly
increased multimodal trips. Among existing users of the app, ride-hailing trips connected
with rail stops increased from 3.0% of trips to 5.5%. In areas where the feature supported
bus connections, trips connecting to bus stops increased from 4.6% to 8.7% among existing
users. Meanwhile, cities where bus travel was not supported by the multimodal feature saw
no change in the rate of bus connections.
Our results provide evidence that the route-planning element of MaaS succeeds in
promoting multimodal travel. We model the commuters’ decision process to show how a
reduction in the cost of planning corresponds to a reduction in the overall cost of travelling
via transit and ride-hailing. By reducing the barriers to multimodal travel, the aggregator
implicitly makes transit and ride hailing more appealing relative to private car travel.
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3.1 Background and Lit Review
MaaS not only aggregates many different modes of transport into a single digital platform
but also provides novel payment models (Sochor et al., 2015; Jittrapirom et al., 2017). Sochor
et al. (2018) classifies MaaS into five levels from 0 to 4. The levels are cumulative. Level 0 is
simply the absence of integration between modes, level 1 is integration of information, level
2 is integration of booking and payment, level 3 is integration of service as a comprehensive
alternative to private car ownership, and level 4 is integration of societal goals through
coordination with public authorities. The most developed existing example of MaaS is
Helsinki’s Whim app, which allows users to book and pay for many different modes of
transport across the city through a single platform (Goodall et al., 2017). MaaS advocates
hope to create more a more sustainable transportation system with less reliance on cars. To
that end, Anagnostopoulou et al. (2020) use strategic messages within an aggregator app
to nudge users towards more sustainable modes of transport.
Aggregators increase the convenience of multimodal trips by offering end-to-end route
planning. Without this feature, a user could manually plan their bus or train route from a
stop near their origin to a stop near their destination. Then they could summon a ride-hailing
vehicle to connect the various legs of the journey. To do this users are required to navigate
back and forth between a GTFS-connected mapping app like Google Maps and a ride-hailing
app like Uber. Sometimes, they may even use more than one ride-hailing app to compare
the price and the time efficiency of ride hailing. This inconvenient process did not allow
for easy planning of multimodal routes, nor did it allow for easy comparison of multimodal
routes against other options. Nonetheless, many users endured this technical inconvenience
to connect ride hailing with transit absent an aggregator app. Hall et al. (2018) find that
Uber is a complement to public transit on average, but more so in larger cities. There is
mounting evidence that ride hailing causes fewer people to own cars, as many substitute
towards a combination of ride hailing and transit to satisfy their urban mobility needs
(Clewlow and Mishra, 2017; Hampshire et al., 2017; Ward et al., 2019).
Ride hailing has been controversial since its introduction, with many cities initially
fighting to stop its entry (Spicer et al., 2019). The industry has clear benefits to consumers.
Cohen et al. (2016) estimate that UberX generated $6.8 billion in consumer surplus in the
United States in 2015. However, critics worry about negative secondary effects. Erhardt
et al. (2019) found that Uber and Lyft greatly increased congestion in San Francisco. They
estimate that ride hailing caused the average speed of vehicles driving in San Francisco to
fall by 2 miles per hour (a 9% decline) due to increased congestion. Ride hailing has had
an ambiguous impact on traffic fatalities, with some research finding increased fatalities
associated with ride hailing companies entering a market (Barrios et al., 2019), some finding
decreased fatalities (Huang et al., 2019), and others finding no change (Brazil and Kirk,
2016; Kirk et al., 2020).
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Although ride hailing remains controversial, the debate on whether to allow its operation
has been largely decided. With Uber operating in over 900 cities worldwide, ride hailing is
here to stay. The relevant policy questions today revolve around how to integrate ride hailing
and other digital platforms for transportation into cities in a way that best serves those
cities’ residents. This means finding policies that can enhance the social benefits of these
platforms while reducing their social costs. Our results show that aggregators integrating
different modes of transport such as ride hailing and transit promote multimodal trips.
Basso and Silva (2014) show that the marginal social cost of transit is below the marginal
social benefit given current policies, so promoting transit through subsidies or other policies
can produce net social benefits. Adopting policies that promote aggregators and MaaS can
help increase transit ridership by making ride hailing and transit more complementary.
3.2 Theory
A commuter wants to travel from a set origin to a set destination while minimizing the cost,
c(·), of the trip. Cost here includes both monetary and time costs. Our data only includes
ride hailing trips that may or may not connect to transit stops. Therefore, we focus on the
case where there are two possible modes of transport: ride hailing (r) or multimodal (m).
The commuter does not know their costs initially, but he has the option to look up a route
for either or both modes in an app, at which point he will know that route’s cost. The
commuter cannot take a mode without first looking up the route. Checking the app takes
time, which the commuter values at a constant value, s.
Assume that the distribution of trip costs for both modes follow a Poisson distribution
with known parameters of λr and λm.1 Apps function by finding the lowest-cost option and
serving that to the user. Whereas basic apps require the user to search each mode separately,
incurring a search cost of s each time, aggregator apps search all modes simultaneously
incurring the search cost only once. Equation (3.1) gives the probability that the lowest
available cost, ci is less than or equal to p given some value of λi.
P (ci ≤ p) = 1− e−λip (3.1)
Solution with an aggregator The aggregator makes the commuter’s problem trivially
solvable. The commuter simultaneously checks both values of ci for a cost of s, then chooses
the lower-cost option. His total cost is given by cost = s+ min{cr, cm}, which follows a cdf
of
1We do not have data that would allow us to estimate the distribution of costs for any given mode, so
we make this parametric assumption to make the model tractable.
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P (cost ≤ p) =
0 if p < s1− e−(λr+λm)(p+s) if p ≥ s . (3.2)
Therefore the expected cost is
E(cost with aggregator) = s+
∫ ∞
0




The probability of choosing a multimodal trip over ride hailing is given by







Solution without an aggregator When the commuter does not have access to an
aggregator, his problem becomes more difficult. He must choose which mode to investigate
first, then, conditional on his observation of ci for that mode, decide whether to observe the
other mode. Figure 3.1 shows the commuter’s decision process.
















The solution to the commuter’s problem can be broken down into two answers: Which
mode should be observed first, and under what condition should the other mode be observed.
Assume that mode i has been observed, and that mode j is unknown. If the commuter
does not observe mode j, his cost is s+ ci. If the commuter does observe mode j, his cost
is 2s + min{ci, cj}. The expected value of observing mode j can be found by taking the
difference between the two costs, and integrating over the probability distribution of cj .
EV (observe j|ci, λj) = −s+
∫ ci
0




Equation (3.5) implies that the expected value of observing mode j is increasing in both λj
and ci. The commuter will observe mode j if and only if this expected value in Equation
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(3.5) is at least zero. Expressing this as a value of ci, we get EV (observe j|ci, λj) = 0 when








where W () is the Lambert W function.2 To fully characterize the solution, we need to
determine which mode the commuter searches first. The commuter minimizes expected cost
by first observing the mode with higher value of λi, i.e. the one with lower expected cost.
If the cost falls below a certain threshold (c̄ in Equation (3.6)), the commuter takes that
mode without observing the other one. If the cost of the first mode is higher than c̄, the
commuter observes the other mode. After observing both modes, the commuter takes the
option with lowest cost.
When the commuter uses this strategy, his probability of choosing a multimodal trip is
conditional on whether he chooses to observe multimodal options. He only does this if the
observed cost of ride hailing is greater than the threshold for observing multimodal, cr ≥ c̄.
Therefore, the probability that the commuter will take a multimodal trip is

















Given this model, our data allows us to find relative values for λr, λm, and s. We observe
the ratio of multimodal trips to pure ride-railing trips without a multimodal component,
both before and after the introduction of an aggregator. After the aggregator is introduced,
the ratio of trips will be purely determined by λr and λm according to Equation (3.4). The
degree to which this differs from the pre-aggregator ratio of trips will be determined by the
relative magnitude of the search cost, s.




We calculate the welfare increase by finding the change in expected cost.
E(cost w/o aggregator) =(s+ E(cr|cr < c̄))P (cr < c̄)
+ P (cr > c̄)[2s+ E(cm|cm < c̄)P (cm < c̄) (3.8)
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+ c̄e−(λr+λm)c̄ + e
−(λr+λm)c̄
(λr + λm)
The expected cost with an aggregator is given in Equation (3.3). We revisit these equations
in Section 3.6 to calibrate the model with data. Given the multimodal rate of travel with
and without an aggregator, we can calculate relative values for λm, λr, and the relative
change in expected cost when an aggregator is made available.
3.3 Data and Analysis
To understand how users changed their behaviour in response to the multimodal feature, we
use a data set consisting of all ride-hailing trips booked through the aggregator app for the
nine months before and the nine months after the treatment date, November 27th, 2018.
There were 110,214 recorded trips in this time, 30,775 before the treatment and 79,439 after
it. Uber accounts for 42% of all trips, Lyft accounts for 27%, and the other 31% of trips are
spread out over various smaller services. In order to detect implicit multimodal behaviour,
we use a data set of the locations of 891,325 transit stops from publicly available GTFS
feeds.
We compare the start and end locations of all ride-hailing trips against transit stop
locations using a k-nearest-neighbour search algorithm (Crookston and Finley, 2008).
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On November 27th, 2018, a popular mapping app was updated to include a multimodal
feature that allowed users to plan multimodal routes connecting ride hailing with rail. The
feature also supported bus connections in nine cities with participating transit agencies.
Trips are considered to connect with a transit stop if they start or end within one meter of
a stop. Existing users are users who first installed the app prior to the introduction of the
multimodal feature.
Trip connects with rail stop(s)
Trip connects with rail and bus stop(s)


























































Figure 3.2 shows how the multimodal rate changed after the introduction of the
multimodal trip planning service. The multimodal rate is defined as
Multimodal rate = Rides starting or ending within 1 meter of a transit stopRides starting or ending within 5 kilometers of a transit stop . (3.11)
While the choices of 1 meter and 5 kilometers are arbitrary, the results are robust to changes
in these specifications (see Appendix C.1).
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After the introduction of the multimodal feature, the multimodal rate for rail stops
increased from 3.0% to 5.1% (p < 0.0001, Fisher’s exact test), as more users incorporated
rail into their ride-hailing trips. Bus routes that were not included in the multimodal feature
saw an insignificant change from 2.0% to 2.1% (p = 0.5334, Fisher’s exact test).
In nine cities with participating transit agencies (Albany, Columbus, Dayton, Detroit,
Kansas City, Las Vegas, Nashville, St. Louis, and St. Petersburg, FL) the app supported
multimodal connections to bus routes. In these cities, bus routes saw their multimodal rate
shoot up from 4.6% to 11.0% (p < 0.0001, Fisher’s exact test). However, some of this
increase can be attributed to a selection effect rather than a causal change on individual
behaviour, as new users who may have been attracted to the app because of the multimodal
feature tended to take more multimodal bus trips when possible. Among users who first
downloaded the app prior to the introduction of the multimodal feature, the multimodal
rate for supported bus routes had a smaller (but still significant, p = 0.0020, Fisher’s exact
test) increase from 4.6% to 8.7%.
Figure 3.3 shows how these multimodal rates changed over time. These results are
suggestive of a causal effect, with both rail and bus stops affected by the feature seeing
a permanent increase in traffic after its introduction, and unaffected bus stops seeing no
change. To verify this intuition, we develop a fixed-effects model that exploits the inclusion
of bus trips in some areas but not others.
Transit agencies in nine cities in the United States collaborated with the app to allow
users to plan multimodal trips connecting ride hailing to bus lines. Outside of the areas
served by these nine agencies, users could only plan multimodal trips connecting to rail
lines. We establish the causal impact of the multimodal bus feature by comparing the
Combined Statistical Areas (CSAs) in the United States serviced by participating transit
agencies to all other CSAs in the US with a sufficient volume of trips (dropping those with
fewer than 50).
The participating transit agencies fall within nine CSAs: Albany-Schenectady in NY,
Columbus-Marion-Zanesville in OH, Dayton-Springfield-Sidney in OH, Detroit-Warren-Ann
Arbor in MI, Kansas City-Overland Park-Kansas City in MO and KS, Las Vegas-Henderson
in NV and AZ, Nashville-Davidson-Murfreesboro in TN, St. Louis-St. Charles-Farmington
in MO and IL, and Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater in FL. We refer to these CSAs as
treated areas.
After dropping all CSAs with fewer than 50 total trips and trips that cannot be identified
with a CSA, we are left with a total of 77468 trips that served by bus (i.e., whose origin
or destination is within 5km of a bus stop) in 44 combined statistical area. Among them,
7523 trips are in the 9 treated statistical areas: 1234 before the treatment and 6289 after it.
There are 69945 trips are in the 35 non-treated statistical areas: 14986 before the treatment
and 54959 after it.
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This figure shows the monthly multimodal rates of ride hailing trips from February 27, 2018
to August 14, 2019. On November 27, 2018, an update allowed users to plan multimodal
trips. They could connect with rail lines everywhere, and with bus lines in select cities with
participating transit agencies. Trips are considered to connect with a transit stop if they
start or end within one meter of a stop.
% of trips connecting with rail stop(s)
% of trips connecting with bus stop(s)
in areas without participating transit agencies
% of trips connecting with bus stop(s)
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3.4 Empirical Models
We study the effect of the multimodal feature on multimodal trips using two distinct models:
a fixed-effects model and an event-study model. We focus on the effect of multimodal support
for bus travel on trips connecting with bus stops, as the partial rollout of this feature allows
for clean causal identification.
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3.4.1 Fixed-Effects Model
Our fixed-effects model exploits the difference in multimodal rates before and after the
treatment day. Our specification is presented in Equation (3.12), where a refers to the CSA
and t refers to the number of months since the treatment date.
Yita = γ0 + γ1Tta + areaa +montht + εita (3.12)
The dependent variable Yita is a binary variable indicating whether trip i’s origin or
destination is within 1 meter of a bus stop in area a and t months since treatment. The
variable of interests is the indicator variable Tta. Tta = 1 if the trip is within the treated
areas and it happened after the introduction of multimodal planning services. Otherwise,
Tta = 0. areaa and montht are the area and month fixed effects to control for the locations
and seasonality.
Since the dependent variable is binary, we use both logit and probit models in our
analysis. γ1 measures the treatment effects.
3.4.2 Event Study Model
Our event-study model focuses on the aggregate weekly rate of multimodal trips. It is
presented in Equation (3.13), where τ is the number of weeks since the treatment date and
α is a binary variable denoting all trips in the CSAs supporting bus trips (when α = 1) and
in all other regions (when α = 0).
yτα = β0 + β1Tτα + β2xτα + β3τ + ετα (3.13)
The dependent variable, yτα, is the rate of trips in week τ and area α that start or end
within 1 meter of a bus stop. Tτα = 1 when τ >= 0 and α = 1. xτα is the rate of trips
ending within 1 meter of a rail stop. The model also includes a linear time trend.
3.5 Results
Our fixed-effects model results are presented in Table 3.1. The coefficient on T , our variable
of interest, is consistently positive and significant at the 5% significance level across all
specifications. In the logit model including month and area fixed effects, the result implies
that after the introduction of multimodal trip planning, the log odds of the multimodal bus
rate has increased by 0.721. So taking the initial multimodal rate of 4.6% in the treated
areas from Figure 3.2, this implies that the multimodal feature caused an increase of 4.4%.
Counterfactually, the model implies that rolling out the multimodal feature for bus routes
in the non-treated areas would increase bus connections from 2.1% of ride-hailing trips to
4.2%.
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Table 3.1: Effects of multimodal trip planning on bus connected ride-hailing trips
Dependent Variable: Whether a trip’s origin or destination is within 1m of a bus stop
Logit Model Probit Model





















Month Fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y
Area Fixed effects N N Y N N Y
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator whether variable showing whether a trip is multimodal,
i.e., its origin or destination is within 1m of a bus stop. Standard errors clustered at the month level
are in parentheses and Newey-West standard errors are in brackets. All the trips’ origin or destination
in the sample is within 5km of a bus stop. Areas with less than 50 trips are excluded.
* Statistical significance at the 0.1 level.
** Statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
When we limit the analysis to existing users only, the results are no longer significant
when month and area fixed effects are included, as shown in Table 3.2. The effect size falls
from 0.721 to 0.463 in the logit model, implying that part of the measured effect came from
attracting new users who were more interested in multimodal travel than the existing ones.
Table 3.3 shows the results of the event study model from Equation (3.13). Consistent
with the fixed-effects model, it shows the introduction of the multimodal feature causing a
positive and significant increase in the rate of ride hailing trips connecting with bus stops,
ranging from a 3.6 to a 6.3 percentage point increase across specifications.
3.6 Discussion
Mobility as a Service is a new industry. Its success depends on the cooperation of policy
makers and incumbent mobility operators such as Uber and Lyft. This study has shown
that, by providing multimodal trip planning services alongside the features of a conventional
mapping app, a MaaS app can successfully encourage consumers to use combined routes
involving ride hailing and public transit.
Only 3.1% of trips before the addition of the multimodal route planning feature
connected to a rail stop. This increased to 5.6% among existing users after the addition of
the feature (Figure 3.2). Referring back to our model from Section 3.2, we can estimate how
high search costs must be relative to the cost distributions of ride-hailing and multimodal
trips. Setting the parameter for ride-hailing λr = 1, a multimodal rate of 5.6% in the absence
of search costs implies λm = 0.059 (Equation (3.4)). This in turn implies a threshold value
of c̄(s, λm) = 0.498 (Equation (3.7)) and a search cost of s = 0.007 (Equation (3.6)). This
50
Table 3.2: Effects of multimodal trip planning on existing users
Dependent Variable: Whether a trip’s origin or destination is within 1m of a bus stop
Logit Model Probit Model





















Month Fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y
Area Fixed effects N N Y N N Y
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator whether variable showing whether a trip is
multimodal, i.e., its origin or destination is within 1m of a bus stop. Standard errors clustered
at the month level are in parentheses and Newey-West standard errors are in brackets. All the trips’
origin or destination in the sample is within 5km of a bus stop. Areas with less than 50 trips are
excluded. Only existing users’ data is used. Existing users are users who first installed the app prior
to the introduction of the multimodal feature.
* Statistical significance at the 0.1 level.
** Statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
Table 3.3: Event study model
Dependent variable:
Bus rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rail rate −0.408∗∗∗ −0.488∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.156)
Multimodal bus support 0.063∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
τ 0.00002 0.0003 −0.00004 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant 0.030∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Observations 154 154 154 154
Existing users only N N Y Y
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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relatively small search friction is sufficient to cause 2.5% of travellers in our sample to take
the more costly mode of transportation. The aggregator reduces costs both by reducing
search costs and by preventing people from taking the more costly mode of transportation.
Given our estimated parameters, the expected cost of a trip, inclusive of search costs, is
0.957 without an aggregator (Equation (3.10)), and 0.952 with one.
To contextualize these numbers, setting λr = 1 means that every other number is
proportional to the average cost of a ride-hailing trip (inclusive of non-monetary costs).
So if this average ride-hailing cost were $20, the estimated fall in users’ travel costs would
be $0.11 per trip. We leave it up to the reader to judge whether this is a large or small effect
for a software update. Perhaps more interesting than the cost reduction is the implication
that small decreases in search frictions can produce significant changes in travel patterns.
By incorporating rail and bus into trips, multimodal travel has lower unpriced
externalities (congestion, pollution) than ride hailing. There is a public interest in promoting
public transit ridership as an alternative to car travel in order to reduce pollution and
congestion. MaaS can be a tool to that end by helping consumers connect the advantages
of public transit with the flexibility and convenience of ride hailing.
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“Three Angry Men: A Framed
Jury Experiment”
A.1 Using Real Trials
The treatment involving real criminal trials presented a problem: With the other treatments,
the true state of the world was randomly generated and known to the experimenter, but real
trials are by their nature uncertain. In order to meet the requirements of the experiment, I
needed a selection of criminal trials and evidence that fit three requirements:
1. There must be a reliable, independent measure of the factual innocence or guilt of the
accused.
2. The trial evidence must be available in some form to show to experimental subjects.
3. The set of innocent and guilty cases should not be systematically different from each
other in ways that affect beliefs independently of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
It is in the nature of criminal trials for the guilt of the accused to be in doubt, so the first
requirement, finding an independent measure of factual guilt, was crucial. The National
Registry of Exonerations provides such a measure. As the registry’s website states, “The
Registry provides detailed information about every known exoneration in the United States
since 1989—cases in which a person was wrongly convicted of a crime and later cleared of
all the charges based on new evidence of innocence.”1
This registry is a strong indication of factual innocence. Since people convicted of crimes
no longer benefit from the presumption of innocence, their exoneration requires strong
1Source: Our Mission. The National Registry of Exonerations. https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/mission.aspx. Retrieved on 2019-10-11.
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affirmative evidence; the burden of proof in such cases is much higher than the reasonable
doubt required for acquittal in a criminal case.
The second requirement—that the trial evidence is available to show to the subjects—was
a limiting factor since the evidence in criminal trials is not generally made public.
Furthermore, the evidence had to be summarized to be evaluated within the time frame of
the experiment. However, summarizing adds the possibility of introducing bias if the person
summarizing knows the outcome.
To get evidence summaries without introducing bias, I relied on reports from journalists
present during criminal trials. I limited cases to homicides since these are much more likely
to receive media attention than other crimes. For the cases drawn from the National Registry
of Exonerations, I sought contemporary articles written during and immediately after the
initial trials. I slightly edited articles that were published immediately after trials to obscure
the verdict since knowledge of the verdict could bias subjects’ perceptions of the evidence.
Otherwise, these articles were presented to subjects without alteration.
Next, I gathered the cases that were not drawn from the registry. These were cases where the
defendant was convicted of a crime and not exonerated; this was my independent metric
for factual guilt. In keeping with the third requirement—that innocent and guilty cases
should not be systematically different from each other—these cases were drawn in matched
pairs from the other articles written by the same journalists or news organizations that
reported on the cases from the exoneration registry. For each case drawn from the registry
and summarized by a journalist, the experiment included one other case summarized by the
same journalist or news organization around the same time.
This controls for several possible sources of bias in the selection of cases. Since the same
journalists or news organizations summarized the innocent and guilty cases, the process of
summarizing the evidence affected both sets of cases independently. The use of contemporary
reports makes the experiment effectively double-blind: Neither the journalists nor the
experimental subjects knew who would eventually be exonerated. Since these journalists
and news organizations are locally based, the matched pairs were drawn from the same
legal jurisdictions, controlling for possible jurisdictional differences.
Finally, I restricted the cases based on their details. Experimental subjects had to assign
subjective probabilities to the factual guilt or innocence of the accused. Therefore, there
must be a clear factual question of guilt. Some court cases involve debates about legal
culpability rather than debates about factual guilt, and these were excluded.
Name Changes The difficulty of doing online research and using real cases is that
subjects may simply Google the names of people involved in cases. For this reason, I
substituted their real names for fake ones. In order to avoid changing the implied ethnicities
of people involved in cases, which may impact subjects’ perceptions, I searched each name on
behindthename.com, a website that provides the etymological origins of many names, and
then I found a substitute name with a similar origin. A name like Garcia, with a Portuguese
origin, was replaced by another Portuguese name like Cruz. A Welsh name like Maddox was
substituted for another Welsh name such as Sayer. This process was somewhat subjective,
but I expect it to have very little impact on the outcomes of the study.
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A.2 Experimental Instructions
Consent for Participation in Experimental Research
Purpose: The purpose of this study, entitled “Deliberation,” is to test different models of
decision-making.
Description: This Human Intelligence Task (HIT) asks you to make a series of choices
among alternatives that involve monetary prizes. The HIT should take approximately 20-30
minutes to complete. Your answers will be used in an academic study on decision-making.
Researchers:











Confidentiality: Your decisions will be kept strictly confidential. We have made every effort
to guarantee your privacy and anonymity. Following the completion of the experiment, data
will be stored on the SFU vault cloud storage service, and as such will be protected under
the BC Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. You will never be identified
by name or any other identifying feature with relation to this study. This experiment was
created with oTree and is hosted on the Heroku cloud platform. Any data hosted within
the United States may be subject to information requests from government agencies under
the U.S. Patriot Act.
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Compensation: You will be paid $2.00 USD for completing this HIT and an additional
bonus payment between 0.10and1.50 may be made, depending on an element of chance and
on your choices.
Potential Risks: This study will involve text-only interaction between you and other
participants. We cannot guarantee the behaviour of your fellow participants, and as such this
experiment carries the same risk of abusive behaviour as all anonymous online interactions.
Contact for Information about the Study: If you have any questions or desire
additional information with respect to this study, you may contact Garrett M. Petersen
at Tel: , or email: @sfu.ca.
If you have any concerns about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences
while participating in this study, you may contact Dr. Jeffrey Toward, Director, SFU
Research Ethics @sfu.ca or .
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you may refuse to participate
or withdraw from the study at any time. You can print this form of the consent form and
maintain it for your own records. NOTE: Please do not take this HIT if you are not willing to
commit 30 minutes of your full concentration to the HIT. The data we collect is being used
for scientific research. We greatly appreciate your full attention and careful consideration
of each question.
This HIT (or any version of it) can only be taken once by each worker. If you complete this
HIT more than once, you will only be paid for the first time.
To consent to participate in the study, enter your Worker ID in the field below, then click
‘Next.’
[Text input box]
(Note: Your worker ID must match the one you used to sign up for this HIT.)
[Next button]
Instructions (1/4)
In this experiment, you will be assigned to a group of 3 to make a joint decision.
The experiment has a number of different scenarios, so we will give a general overview before
your group is assigned and the scenario is determined.
Each scenario has two possible states of the world, e.g. “Red” and “Blue.” One of these states
will be randomly selected with equal probability prior to the start of the experiment. In the
first stage of the experiment, you and your group members will each be shown evidence
related to the true state.
After observing your evidence, you will be asked to make two choices: First, you will get
to cast a vote for what you think the true state is. Second, you will be asked to state your
belief as a percentage (0-100%) in one of the two states. Neither your votes nor your beliefs
will be shown to other players at any time.
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Click “Next” to proceed to the next page of the instructions.
[Next button]
Instructions (2/4)
Once you have cast your initial vote and stated your initial belief, you will proceed to
the deliberation stage. This stage will feature a chat box where you may discuss anything
you like with your fellow group members. The chat stage will last a fixed amount of time,
depending on the scenario.
After you have completed the deliberation stage, your entire group will get the chance to
vote again, and to report your updated beliefs, just like in the first stage. These are the
final decisions in the experiment. After everyone has made their decisions, your payments
will be determined.




To recap, by the end of the experiment you will have made four decisions:
1. An initial vote
2. An initial belief
3. A final vote
4. A final belief
One of these four will be randomly selected, with equal probability, to determine your
payment.
If a vote is selected, then what matters is what the majority of group members voted for. If
the majority voted correctly (i.e. for the true state determined at the start), then everyone
will get a high payoff. (Payoffs vary slightly in different scenarios, so we will tell you exactly
what they are once your group has been assigned and the scenario has been selected.) If
the majority voted incorrectly, then everyone in the group will get a low payoff of $0.10.




If a belief is selected for payment, each group member’s payoff will be separately determined
by their own belief.
The mechanism for determining payoffs from a belief are as follows:
Imagine 100 robots numbered from 1 to 100, all lined up in order.
Each of these robots is capable of predicting the true state of the world with a probability
equal to their number. For instance, Robot 14 is only capable of predicting correctly 14
times out of every hundred, whereas the much cleverer Robot 89 is capable of predicting
correctly 89 times out of every hundred. Robot 50 is no better or worse at predicting than
a coin toss.
Let’s say you are trying to guess whether the true state of the world is “Heads” or “Tails.”
You don’t have any evidence one way or the other, so when asked to state your belief that
the state is “Heads,” you say your belief is 50%.
If this belief is selected for payment, a random robot will be selected from the line. If the
robot has a higher number than your belief (68 for instance), then the robot will guess for
you, and you will earn $1.00 if he is correct and $0.10 otherwise. If the robot has a lower or
equal number than your belief (41 for instance) then the robot won’t matter and you will
get $1.00 if the true state is “Heads” and $0.10 otherwise.
You maximize your chance of getting a high payoff by truthfully reporting what you believe.
If your true belief is 50% and you say it’s 55%, then you will miss out on the chance to have
robots 51 to 54 guess for you, and they all have better odds than you do. If you say your
belief is 45%, then you might have robots 46 to 49 guess for you, and they all have worse
odds than you do.
[Next button]
Summary and Quiz
The following points summarize the instructions:
• You will be sorted into a group of 3.
• A true state of the world will be selected at random by the computer.
• You will be shown evidence pointing towards what that true state is.
• You and your group members will vote on the true state.
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• You will report your belief, as a percentage chance, in one of the possible true states.
• Your group will deliberate for five minutes.
• You and your group members will vote and state your beliefs a second time.
• One vote or belief will be selected for payment. Each of the four choices (first vote,
first belief, second vote, second belief) have an equal chance of being selected.
• If a vote is selected, the whole group gets a high payoff if a majority voted correctly.
• If a belief is selected, all players are paid individually according to the robot
mechanism:
– A random robot from 1 to 100 is selected.
– If the robot’s number is less than or equal to your belief, you get a high payoff
so long as the outcome being predicted is true.
– If the robot’s number is greater than your belief, the robot guesses for you.
– Robot number X guesses correctly X percent of the time.
Quiz
Complete the following quiz to proceed to the experiment.
1. In the deliberation phase, why should you care what other players think?
Because their beliefs matter for your payoff.
Because their votes matter for your payoff.
You shouldn’t care.
Because truth is a value onto itself.
2. You are asked for your belief that the sun will rise tomorrow. Assuming you are
certain that it will, what belief will maximize your odds of a high payoff under the
robot mechanism?
[Slider from 0 to 100]
3. You state a belief of 25% that two coin flips will both come up heads. Robot 37 is
selected. What happens?
The robot is ignored. You get a high payoff if at least one coin is not heads.
The robot is ignored. You get a high payoff if both coins come up heads.
The robot guesses for you. It has a 25% chance of guessing correctly.
The robot guesses for you. It has a 37% chance of guessing correctly.
4. You state a belief of 25% that two coin flips will both come up heads. Robot 15 is
selected. What happens?
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The robot is ignored. You get a high payoff if at least one coin is not heads.
The robot is ignored. You get a high payoff if both coins come up heads.
The robot guesses for you. It has a 25% chance of guessing correctly.
The robot guesses for you. It has a 15% chance of guessing correctly.





6. Do you have any pressing appointments in the next half hour or so?
No, I don’t
Actually...
Warning: If you get more than 20 wrong quiz answers through successive tries on the quiz,
you will be prevented from proceeding, and your HIT will be rejected.
[Next button]
Scenario [Objective Nonpartisan Treatment]
There are two jars: one red and one blue. The red jar contains 7 red balls and 3 blue balls,
while the blue jar contains 3 red balls and 7 blue balls.
The computer has randomly selected one of these jars, each having an equal chance of being
the one selected.
On the next screen, you will be shown one ball that has been randomly selected from the
true jar. Your group members will each be shown a different draw (with replacement) from
the jar. You will be casting votes and selecting beliefs on the colour of the true jar.
If one of the votes is selected for payment, then your group will earn $1.00 each if at least
two members voted for the true jar colour, and $0.10 otherwise.
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If one of the beliefs is selected for payment, you will be individually paid according to the
robot mechanism described previously. Remember, you maximize your chances of getting a
high payoff by always truthfully reporting your beliefs.
[Next button]
The following table shows the bonus payments in all possible cases. It will be displayed
below later pages in case you need to review it.
Vote Selected for Payment
Colour is Red Colour is Blue
Majority Votes Red $1.00 $0.10
Majority Votes Blue $0.10 $1.00
Belief Selected for Payment
Colour is Red Colour is Blue
Belief > Robot Number $1.00 $0.10
Belief ≤ Robot Number $1.00 if robot guesses right,
$0.10 if robot guesses wrong
Scenario [Objective Partisan Treatment]
There are two jars: one red and one blue. The red jar contains 7 red balls and 3 blue balls,
while the blue jar contains 3 red balls and 7 blue balls.
The computer has randomly selected one of these jars, each having an equal chance of being
the one selected.
On the next screen, you will be shown one ball that has been randomly selected from the
true jar. Your group members will each be shown a different draw (with replacement) from
the jar. You will be casting votes and selecting beliefs on the colour of the true jar.
If one of the votes is selected for payment, then your group will earn only $0.10 each if a
majority vote for the wrong jar colour. If a majority votes correctly, then things are a little
more complicated. Each member of your group has an equal chance of “leaning” towards
one colour or the other. If the group votes for the answer you lean towards, and that answer
is correct, you get $1.50. If the group votes for the answer you don’t lean towards, and that
answer is correct, you get only $0.50. It is still always better to choose the right colour, but
if the right colour is the colour you lean towards, that’s even better for you.
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You lean towards RED.
If one of the beliefs is selected for payment, you will be individually paid according to the
robot mechanism described previously. Remember, you maximize your chances of getting a
high payoff by always truthfully reporting your beliefs.
[Next button]
The following table shows the bonus payments in all possible cases. It will be displayed
below later pages in case you need to review it.
Vote Selected for Payment
Colour is Red Colour is Blue
Majority Votes Red $1.50 $0.10
Majority Votes Blue $0.10 $0.50
Belief Selected for Payment
Colour is Red Colour is Blue
Belief > Robot Number $1.00 $0.10
Belief ≤ Robot Number $1.00 if robot guesses right,
$0.10 if robot guesses wrong
Scenario [Subjective Nonpartisan Treatment]
The computer has randomly picked a colour: red or blue. Both colours had an equal chance
of being selected.
On the next screen, you and the other members of your group will all be given exactly 10
seconds to look at the same 20 by 20 grid of red and blue balls. There will be exactly ten
more balls of the colour the computer picked.
You will be casting votes and selecting beliefs on which colour has more balls in the grid.
If one of the votes is selected for payment, then your group will earn $1.00 each if at least
two members voted for the correct colour, and $0.10 otherwise.
If one of the beliefs is selected for payment, you will be individually paid according to the
robot mechanism described previously. Remember, you maximize your chances of getting a
high payoff by always truthfully reporting your beliefs.
[Next button]
The following table shows the bonus payments in all possible cases. It will be displayed
below later pages in case you need to review it.
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Vote Selected for Payment
Colour is Red Colour is Blue
Majority Votes Red $1.00 $0.10
Majority Votes Blue $0.10 $1.00
Belief Selected for Payment
Colour is Red Colour is Blue
Belief > Robot Number $1.00 $0.10
Belief ≤ Robot Number $1.00 if robot guesses right,
$0.10 if robot guesses wrong
Scenario [Subjective Partisan Treatment]
The computer has randomly picked a colour: red or blue. Both colours had an equal chance
of being selected.
On the next screen, you and the other members of your group will all be given exactly 10
seconds to look at the same 20 by 20 grid of red and blue balls. There will be exactly ten
more balls of the colour the computer picked.
You will be casting votes and selecting beliefs on which colour has more balls in the grid.
If one of the votes is selected for payment, then your group will earn only $0.10 each if a
majority vote for the wrong colour. If a majority votes correctly, then things are a little
more complicated. Each member of your group “leans” towards one colour. If the group
votes for the answer you lean towards, and that answer is correct, you get $1.50. If the
group votes for the answer you don’t lean towards, and that answer is correct, you get only
$0.50. It is still always better to choose the right colour, but if the right colour is the colour
you lean towards, that’s even better for you.
You lean towards BLUE.
If one of the beliefs is selected for payment, you will be individually paid according to the
robot mechanism described previously. Remember, you maximize your chances of getting a
high payoff by always truthfully reporting your beliefs.
[Next button]
The following table shows the bonus payments in all possible cases. It will be displayed
below later pages in case you need to review it.
Vote Selected for Payment
Colour is Red Colour is Blue
Majority Votes Red $0.50 $0.10
Majority Votes Blue $0.10 $1.50
Belief Selected for Payment
Colour is Red Colour is Blue
Belief > Robot Number $1.00 $0.10
Belief ≤ Robot Number $1.00 if robot guesses right,
$0.10 if robot guesses wrong
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Scenario [Framed Treatment]
On the next page, you will be shown a real news article about a jury trial. The article has
been lightly edited, but no details of the evidence have been changed. It was written at the
time of the trial by a journalist who was there in the court room. You and your group will
be deciding whether the defendant is GUILTY or INNOCENT.
We ask that you not do any independent research. Please limit your investigation to the
details of the article presented on the following page.
This case was randomly selected from a large number of cases. Importantly, in half of
the cases in our set, later evidence emerged proving that the defendant could not have
committed the crime, and they were exonerated of all legal consequences. These defendants
are considered to be innocent for the purpose of this study. The other half of cases
feature defendants who were convicted and whose convictions were never overturned. These
defendants are considered to be guilty for the purpose of this study.
If one of the votes is selected for payment, then your group will earn $1.00 each if at least
two members voted correctly, and $0.10 otherwise.
If one of the beliefs is selected for payment, you will be individually paid according to the
robot mechanism described previously. Remember, you maximize your chances of getting a
high payoff by always truthfully reporting your beliefs.
Since this version of the experiment takes longer than average, you will be given an
additional bonus of $0.50 in addition to your other earnings throughout the experiment.
WARNING: The story on the following page may contain descriptions of crime,
violence, and death. If you are easily disturbed, it is not recommended that you
continue. Remember that you can exit the experiment at any point without
penalty.
[Next button]
The following table shows the bonus payments in all possible cases. It will be displayed
below later pages in case you need to review it.
Vote Selected for Payment
Colour is Red Colour is Blue
Majority Votes Red $1.50 $0.60
Majority Votes Blue $0.60 $1.50
Belief Selected for Payment
Colour is Red Colour is Blue
Belief > Robot Number $1.50 $0.60
Belief ≤ Robot Number $1.50 if robot guesses right,





Kimbrough, Petersen, and Tong
2018)
B.1 Review of current practice
Inclusion/Exclusion criteria
We included experimental papers published between January 2011 and December 2016
in six journals: the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Quarterly Journal
of Economics, the Journal of Political Economy, the Review of Economic Studies, and
Experimental Economics. Articles from the AER: Papers and Proceedings were excluded.
In order to be included, a paper had to include at least one lab experiment. We
excluded field experiments and online experiments that were not conducted in a controlled
environment, but we include “lab-in-the-field” experiments that were conducted in a
controlled environment.
To classify each included experiment, we reviewed both the text of each paper and
supplementary materials available online through the journal’s website, with the exception
of uncompiled code (e.g. z-Tree code).
Coding Criteria: Delivery
Delivery methods could include paper instructions or computer instructions. Values in the
supplementary table are 1 for yes, 0 for no, 0.5 for uncertain. In some cases, an alternative
delivery method was used; for example, Etang et al. (2011) studied subjects in rural
Cameroon and used purely verbal instructions because many subjects were illiterate.
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We code the study as having paper instructions if it is directly stated or clearly implied that
a set of paper instructions were used. Some papers were explicit about their use of printed
instructions, while others required us to infer the existence of paper instructions from other
details. For instance, Mittone and Ploner (2011, p. 207) write that "after the choices are
collected, instructions for the beliefs elicitation phase are distributed." Distribution implies
a written set of instructions, though this is not explicitly stated. Sometimes we inferred
the form of instructions from the instructions themselves, for instance in Altmann et al.
(2014), the instructions included screenshots, from which we inferred that they must have
been printed on paper.
We code the study as having computer instructions if it is directly stated or clearly implied
that computerized instructions were used. Sometimes this was explicit, while other times it
had to be inferred. For instance, in papers that included copies of their instructions online,
some instructions told participants to click on something to proceed to the next screen.
This implies that the instructions are computerized, even if it is not explicitly stated in the
text of that paper. Cox and James (2012, Supplement p. 2) end their instructions by telling
their subjects, “When you have finished reading and have asked any questions you might
have, please click Done.”
Many papers are unclear on whether the instructions are given on paper or on computers. If
there was no explicit statement of the form of instructions in the paper itself, and no clear
indication from the instructions where these were available online, the paper was coded as
uncertain.
Coding Criteria: Reinforcement
We coded four different forms of reinforcement.
1. Read aloud. We code an experiment as having read aloud its instructions if it is stated
or clearly implied that the instructions were presented orally. Most often this meant that
the experimenter read the instructions for the participants to hear. Some studies, such as
Aycinena et al. (2014, p. 110), included voice recordings of the instructions, which we coded
as read aloud as indicated by the following quote “They were provided with instructions
and were also shown a video which read these instructions aloud.”
2. Demonstration or guided practice. We code a paper as including demonstration
or guided practice if we can infer that it used walk-throughs of the experimental
interface, examples, or demonstrations of aspects of the experiment during the instructions
phase. Walk-throughs involve actively-guided practice by the subject. Examples include
hypothetical descriptions of potential actions and consequent outcomes. For instance,
Brookins and Ryvkin (2014) give subjects an example of the likelihood of success, conditional
on the group members’ investment. Demonstrations actively highlight one or more aspects
of the experiment, for example, throwing a die to show subjects how uncertainty will be
resolved as in Ericson and Fuster (2011). The mere use of graphical or tabular methods to
communicate information, or providing screenshots in paper instructions, was considered
neither demonstration nor guided practice.
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3. Unguided practice. If the experiment included one or more unpaid practice rounds
without guidance, we coded this as unguided practice. Sometimes this was explicit in the
body of the paper, while other times it was only indicated in the instructions themselves.
4. Quiz. Quizzes or questionnaires were only included if they occurred after the
instructions and before the experiment. Many experiments include questionnaires to check
participants’ understanding ex post, but these are not counted as they do not reinforce
participants’ understanding of the instructions before the experiment.
When a quiz was given, we checked whether feedback was given after the quiz and before the
experiment. If it was clearly stated that subjects were given the correct answers to the quiz,
“Feedback” was coded as a 1. If subjects must get 100% to proceed with the experiment,
we infer that feedback was given. Many papers give quizzes to “ensure comprehension
of instructions” but do not explicitly indicate whether answers were given. For example
Cabrera et al. (2013, p. 432) indicate that “subjects completed a quiz to make sure they
had fully understood the logic of the game.” It is ambiguous whether this implies that
feedback was given to promote subject understanding ex-ante or instead quiz performance
was used by the experimenters to assess subject comprehension ex-post. Such papers are
coded as uncertain with respect to quiz feedback. We also separately code whether subjects
were paid for correct quiz answers (Incentivized) and whether participants were required to
get all questions correct before continuing (Require 100%).
Coding Criteria: Some main task(s) is (are) one shot
We classified the main task or tasks for each experiment. If at least one of the main tasks is
one shot (that is, subject can be viewed as making a single decision) in one or more of the
treatments, we coded that paper as having a one shot main task under this column. When
researchers use a choice list or the strategy method – where multiple similar decisions are
made almost simultaneously, and could in-principle be viewed as one decision – we view
this task as a one-shot task. In contrast, when decisions are made in a sequence, even
without feedback, we would not consider those to constitute a one-shot task. Anderson
et al.’s (2011) study provides an edge case. In their experiment, each subject plays six
public goods games with different parameter values, but all six choices are presented at the
same time. Since all choices are instances of the same basic task and are presented at once,
we coded their experiment as one shot. If these tasks had been presented sequentially on
separate screens, we would not have coded this as one shot. An interesting boundary case is
a dynamic game with an evolving state variable (e.g. the money supply variable in Petersen
and Winn (2014)); subjects in such games make repeated decisions in the same task, but
with different incentives depending on the state. We have coded these as repeated (i.e. not
one shot) because there is typically feedback between decisions and the state dependence
is usually not so severe that subsequent decisions differ fundamentally from those made in
initial round. The opportunities for learning from repetition thus usually dominate (though
not necessarily always), and we note that we did not explicitly account for this in our coding.
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Coding Criteria: Some main task(s) has (have) feedback between decisions
If at least one of the main tasks was repeated with feedback between rounds in one or more
of the treatments, we coded that paper as having a repeated main task with feedback under
this column (e.g. a repeated public goods game in which subjects learned their payoff after
each round (e.g. Bayer et al. (2013)). We considered it sufficient for a subsequent round to
involve choices in the same basic task as the preceding one for which feedback was given. For
example, in Noussair and Stoop (2015), subjects in one treatment completed two dictator
games in a row, with different reward media (money and time) with feedback between them
– we viewed these as repetitions of the same task with feedback.
Coding Criteria: More than one task
We coded whether an experiment has more than one incentivized task. In some cases, an
experiment required subjects to input multiple separate decisions associated with the same
broader task – in these instances, we coded this a single task (as discussed above). Sometimes
a single task has multiple decisions (e.g. a centipede game as in Cox and James (2012) or a
public goods game with punishment as in Harris et al. (2015)). Similarly, in an experiment
that required subjects to vote on a sanctioning scheme that would then be implemented in
a public goods game (Kamei et al., 2015), we viewed the vote and the subsequent game as
one task. Many experiments coded as having more than one task would follow up a main
task with a secondary preference elicitation.
Cross-Check
Each paper was independently coded by two coders, who read each of the 260 papers in
the review along with any instructions available in their online supplementary materials.
For each of the 11 categories coded, both coders marked them as true (=1), false (=0), or
uncertain (=0.5). Both coders agreed most of the time, only disagreeing (including cases
where one coder was uncertain) in 363 out of 11 × 260 judgments, and only disagreeing
fundamentally (i.e. one coder marking a “0” and the other a “1” on a given paper-category
judgment) in 200 such judgments. The area with the most disagreement was the presence
of demonstration, examples, or guided practice. These are particularly difficult to identify,
as they are often buried in lengthy instructions and the difference between explanation and
demonstration is somewhat subjective. We note that false negatives are more likely than
false positives – it is easy to miss an example or demonstration in instructions but hard to
see one where it doesn’t actually exist. After each person coded independently, both coders
reconciled disagreements to put together the data for Table 2.1. Typically, when only one
coder was uncertain, disagreement was resolved in favour of the certain coder. In the case
of genuine disagreement coders discussed and settled on the most likely classification.
Correlations amongst practices
One-shot experiments account for about one third of the experiments using computerized
instructions (31%) or paper instructions (35%). 57% of experiments that use neither paper
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Table B.1: Correlation between experiment type and delivery and reinforcement
One-shot p-value Feedback between decisions p-value
Paper only .048 .437 .008 .899
Computer only -.011 .863 -.082 .189
Both .018 .770 .022 .722
Neither .157 .011 -.180 .004
Read aloud .112 .072 -.092 .141
Practice/Demonstration -.191 .002 .190 .002
Quiz -.146 .019 .159 .010
Table reports pairwise correlations between delivery/reinforcement
category (rows) and experiment type (columns) and their p-values.
Table B.2: Instruction practices by feedback
One-shot Feedback between decisions
Total 84 152
Read aloud 52 76
Practice/Demonstration 36 98
Quiz 24 69
nor on-screen instructions are one-shot games; most of these studies are field experiments
in which experimenters read instructions aloud or go through the instruction one-on-one
with subjects.
We also find that one-shot experiments tend to be less likely to use each of the reinforcement
methods (except for reading aloud) – even though such experiments give no feedback,
making each subject’s initial understanding of the instructions crucial. We suspect that
this is because one-shot experiments tend to be simpler and therefore easier to explain.
Instructions are read aloud more often in one-shot game experiments (62%) than in
experiments with feedback between decisions (50%). Other reinforcement methods are used
less often in one-shot experiments than in experiments with feedback between decisions
(respectively, 43% versus 65% use some form of practice or demonstration, while 29%
versus 45% use a quiz). These differences result in a significant negative association between
one-shot experiments and use of practice/demonstration (ρ = −.191, p = .002) and quizzes
(ρ = −.146, p = .019) in the instructions.
B.2 Experimental Instructions
The experimental sessions all followed the script in Figure B.1.
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Figure B.1: Experimenter’s script for running a session
How to Run a Session 
1. Log in to computer 24 with your SFU email 
2. Log in to students’ computers using username “econ subject” and password “economics” 
(computers 11 and 12 sometimes freeze!) 
3. Open ESILauncher on computer 24 
4. Highlight the machine numbers students are using 
5. Check the Auto Connect box 
6. Select the file “C:\Experiments\PoodleJump\Client\Client.exe” 
a. Replace leading dots with “C:\Experiments” 
7. Open “C:\Experiments\PoodleJump\Server\Server.exe” on computer 24 
8. Hit “Load Settings” button and select 
“C:\Experiments\PoodleJump\Server\ExperimentSettings\Low.txt” 
9. As participants arrive, mark them as “participated” on http://experiments.econ.sfu.ca/ 
10. Set the number of participants in both ESI and Server 
11. Give consent forms and receipts and instruct participants to fill out everything except the 
payment amount 
12. Take in consent forms 
13. Give the pre-experiment speech 
a. Eyes on own screen 
b. Don’t communicate with other participants 
c. Raise hand to ask question 
d. No food 
e. Keep drinks in closed containers 
f. Cell phones away 
g. If doing paid quiz, explain about the paid quiz 
14. Click the big green check mark in ESI to launch the program 
15. Instruct subjects to click “Run” 
16. Tell participants to sit quietly once they have finished instructions 
17. (if doing quiz) Tell them about quiz (and incentives if quiz is incentivized) 
18. Click “Begin Instructions” 
19. Allow them to go through the instructions 
20. (if doing quiz) Hand out quiz 
21. (if doing quiz) Take in quiz 
22. (if doing quiz + answers) Read quiz answers 
23. Click start button 
24. (if doing quiz) Grade quiz during the experiment 
25. Mark experiment as “Finished” on http://experiments.econ.sfu.ca/ 
26. When experiment is complete, ask students to wait at their computers and have their receipts 
ready 
27. Call students by computer number and pay them $7+their experiment payoff, filling out dollar 
amounts in each receipt 
28. Move data files from “..\PoodleJump\Server\Server_Data\” into 
“Dropbox\PoodleJump\data\[appropriate folder]\” 
We include copies of all instructions pages as seen by each subject in all treatments. First,
we show the screenshots that apply for all except for the ENHANCED treatment. Note that
the printed instructions for the paper treatment did not include the screenshots shown in
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Figure B.5.4 and Figure B.7.6, since they completed practice periods for Tasks 1 and 2 as
part of the on-screen instructions, like all other subjects.
Figure B.2: Instructions page 1: introduction to the experiment
Figure B.3: Instructions page 2: description of Task 1
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Figure B.4: Instructions page 3: Task 1 practice
Figure B.5: Instructions page 4: description of Task 2
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Figure B.6: Instructions page 5: Task 2 practice
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Figure B.7: Instructions page 6: payment schedule description
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Figure B.8: Instructions page 7: summary
Next, we include screenshots from the instructions from the ENHANCED treatment. Note
that, unlike in the other treatments, the final summary screen remained displayed in the
ENHANCED while subjects wrote the quiz.
Figure B.9: ENHANCED Instructions page 1: introduction to the experiment
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Figure B.10: ENHANCED Instructions page 2: overview and payment
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Figure B.11: ENHANCED Instructions page 3: payment examples
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Figure B.12: ENHANCED Instructions page 4: description of Task 1
Figure B.13: ENHANCED Instructions page 5: Task 1 practice
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Figure B.14: ENHANCED Instructions page 6: description of Task 2
Figure B.15: ENHANCED Instructions page 7: Task 2 practice
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Figure B.16: ENHANCED Instructions page 8: payment recap
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Figure B.17: ENHANCED Instructions page 7: summary
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Our quiz, which was included after the instructions and before the main experiment in all
treatments except for NO QUIZ, featured the following six questions:
Figure B.18: Post-instructions quiz
In our follow-up experimental sessions, we slightly re-worded some of the quiz questions to
make them more clear. This new quiz was administered to all subjects in the ENHANCED
treatment and some of the subjects in the QUIZ treatment.
Figure B.19: Revised post-instructions quiz
While scores in the QUIZ treatment did increase slightly under the new quiz, from an
average of 3.9 to 4.4, this difference is not statistically significant (p = .11, rank-sum test),
and thus we pool data from all QUIZ sessions. We also did not observe any significant
differences in NMB (p = .50, Fisher’s exact test).
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B.3 Robustness checks
We redo our analysis with three alternative measures of NMB to check the robustness our
results. The specifications reported in Table B.3.1-3 are all analogous to the specifications in
Table 2.4, but with alternative definitions of NMB. The dependent variable “NMB1” is equal
to one if the subject did Task 2 before period 21 and equal to zero otherwise; this measure
of NMB allows for trembles. The “NMB2” variable defines any behavioural deviation from
optimality as NMB. That is, it classifies a subject as exhibiting NMB unless they did Task
2 exactly in period 22. Finally, the “NMB3” variable classifies those who did Task 2 before
period 22 or never at all as NMB. The results of these alternative specifications are broadly
consistent with those reported in Table 4. Figure B.20.1 plots the share of subjects with
NMB in each treatment, by each of these alternative measures. To check the robustness of
our logit regressions, Table B.20.4 reports estimated linear probability models with (OLS
analogues to columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4); for comparison purposes note that we do not
report marginal effects in Table 2.4 since the mediation analysis in column 4 provides the
economically meaningful estimates of interest.




















NO QUIZ QUIZ ANSWERS INCENTIVE TWICE PAPER ENHANCED
We note that our statistical tests find significant differences between our main QUIZ
treatment and each of our INCENTIVE, TWICE, PAPER, and ENHANCED treatments,
but do not detect significant differences among the latter four treatments, and also detects
no significant difference between the ANSWERS treatment and other treatments (see Table
2.2 in the main text). This raises the question of statistical power. We note that the
comparisons between the QUIZ treatment and each of the INCENTIVE, TWICE, PAPER,
and ENHANCED treatments appear to be appropriately powered. Across the latter four
treatments, 21.6% of subject misunderstand (a fraction which ranges between 18.4-23.7%
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Table B.3: Treatment effects on NMB1 and Quiz Scores
Dependent variable Mediation analysis
NMB1 Quiz Score NMB1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NO QUIZ -0.301 n
(-1.096, 0.495)
ANSWERS -0.825* 0.207 -0.050 -0.169*
112(-1.746, 0.096) (-2.648, 3.061) (-0.586, 0.487) (-0.329, 0.008)ANSWERS × Quiz Score -0.324 0.005
(-1.062, 0.413) (-0.056, 0.070)
INCENTIVE -0.894* -1.380 0.211 -0.164*
114(-1.810, 0.022) (-4.202, 1.422) (-0.354, 0.775) (-0.331, 0.021)INCENTIVE × Quiz Score 0.127 -0.022
(-0.508, 0.762) (-0.091, 0.039)
TWICE -1.247** -0.677 0.421 -0.199**
114(-2.244, -0.249) (-3.940, 2.586) (-0.156, 0.998) (-0.367, -0.010)TWICE × Quiz Score -0.135 -0.044
(-0.847, 0.578) (-0.119, 0.016)
PAPER -1.123** 7.787** 1.320*** 0.163
116(-2.070, -0.176) (1.053, 14.521) (0.922, 1.718) (-0.118, 0.375)PAPER × Quiz Score -1.632** -0.133***
(-2.901, -0.363) (-0.223, -0.046)
ENHANCED -1.028** 0.249 0.489* -0.139*
113(-1.981, -0.074) (-3.675, 4.174) (-0.030, 1.008) (-0.325, 0.060)ENHANCED × Quiz Score -0.273 -0.051*
(-1.144, 0.598) (-0.123, 0.003)
Quiz Score -0.519***
(-0.875, -0.164)
Intercept -0.427* 1.662** 4.105***
(-0.893, 0.038) (0.121, 3.202) (3.789, 4.422)
Observations 308 265 265
QUIZ is the omitted category. *, **, and *** respectively denote p < .1, p < .05, p < .01. Robust (HC1) 95%
confidence intervals are in parentheses in Columns (1)-(4). Mediation column reports estimated “direct effects” in
the row of a treatment dummy, and mediated effects in the row of the interaction term between Quiz Score and that
treatment dummy, both evaluated relative to the QUIZ baseline. That is, the direct effect of a treatment corresponds
to E[NMB|Treatment,Quiz Score = 4.1]− E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1], while the mediated effect
corresponds to E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = E[Quiz Score|Treatment]]− E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1].
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Table B.4: Treatment effects on NMB2 and Quiz Scores
Dependent variable Mediation analysis
NMB2 Quiz Score NMB2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NO QUIZ -0.044 n
(-0.812, 0.724)
ANSWERS -0.373 -1.477 -0.050 -0.103
112(-1.179, 0.434) (-5.163, 2.209) (-0.586, 0.487) (-0.268, 0.070)ANSWERS × Quiz Score 0.192 0.009
(-0.624, 1.009) (-0.098, 0.116)
INCENTIVE -0.800* -2.840 0.211 -0.164*
114(-1.605, 0.004) (-6.591, 0.911) (-0.354, 0.775) (-0.344, 0.013)INCENTIVE × Quiz Score 0.443 -0.042
(-0.353, 1.239) (-0.157, 0.069)
TWICE -1.402*** -2.201 0.421 -0.254***
114(-2.267, -0.538) (-6.525, 2.122) (-0.156, 0.998) (-0.424, -0.078)TWICE × Quiz Score 0.130 -0.084
(-0.879, 1.138) (-0.203, 0.031)
PAPER -1.471*** 8.269 1.320*** 0.056
116(-2.331, -0.612) (-4.351, 20.889) (0.922, 1.718) (-0.288, 0.236)PAPER × Quiz Score -1.652 -0.284***
(-4.001, 0.698) (-0.389, -0.182)
ENHANCED -1.233*** -2.724 0.489* -0.216**
113(-2.083, -0.383) (-6.883, 1.434) (-0.030, 1.008) (-0.402, -0.033)ENHANCED × Quiz Score 0.345 -0.101*
(-0.560, 1.249) (-0.212, 0.007)
Quiz Score -1.344***
(-1.872, -0.816)
Intercept 0.373 6.236*** 4.105***
(-0.090, 0.835) (3.637, 8.836) (3.789, 4.422)
Observations 308 265 265
QUIZ is the omitted category. *, **, and *** respectively denote p < .1, p < .05, p < .01. Robust (HC1) 95%
confidence intervals are in parentheses in Columns (1)-(4). Mediation column reports estimated “direct effects” in
the row of a treatment dummy, and mediated effects in the row of the interaction term between Quiz Score and that
treatment dummy, both evaluated relative to the QUIZ baseline. That is, the direct effect of a treatment corresponds
to E[NMB|Treatment,Quiz Score = 4.1]− E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1], while the mediated effect
corresponds to E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = E[Quiz Score|Treatment]]− E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1].
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Table B.5: Treatment effects on NMB3 and Quiz Scores
Dependent variable Mediation analysis
NMB3 Quiz Score NMB3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NO QUIZ 0.223 n
(-0.540, 0.987)
ANSWERS -0.442 -0.360 -0.050 -0.112
112(-1.252, 0.369) (-3.559, 2.839) (-0.586, 0.487) (-0.278, 0.070)ANSWERS × Quiz Score -0.075 0.009
(-0.851, 0.702) (-0.089, 0.106)
INCENTIVE -0.759* -2.207 0.211 -0.157*
114(-1.810, 0.022) (-5.334, 0.921) (-0.354, 0.775) (-0.336, 0.028)INCENTIVE × Quiz Score 0.127 -0.037
(-0.508, 0.762) (-0.141, 0.063)
TWICE -1.135*** -0.365 0.421 -0.183**
114(-1.996, -0.274) (-4.401, 3.670) (-0.156, 0.998) (-0.356, -0.004)TWICE × Quiz Score -0.193 -0.074
(-1.163, 0.776) (-0.181, 0.026)
PAPER -1.342*** 5.617 1.320*** 0.074
116(-2.220, -0.464) (-2.618, 13.852) (0.922, 1.718) (-0.252, 0.278)PAPER × Quiz Score -1.143 -0.240***
(-2.649, -0.363) (-0.340, -0.143)
ENHANCED -1.099** 0.321 0.489* -0.158*
113(-1.962, -0.235) (-3.790, 4.431) (-0.030, 1.008) (-0.349, 0.028)ENHANCED × Quiz Score -0.314 -0.088*
(-1.201, 0.574) (-0.189, 0.006)
Quiz Score -1.021***
(-1.471, -0.571)
Intercept 0.105 4.400*** 4.105***
(-0.350, 0.561) (2.314, 6.486) (3.789, 4.422)
Observations 308 265 265
QUIZ is the omitted category. *, **, and *** respectively denote p < .1, p < .05, p < .01. Robust (HC1) 95%
confidence intervals are in parentheses in Columns (1)-(4). Mediation column reports estimated “direct effects” in
the row of a treatment dummy, and mediated effects in the row of the interaction term between Quiz Score and that
treatment dummy, both evaluated relative to the QUIZ baseline. That is, the direct effect of a treatment corresponds
to E[NMB|Treatment,Quiz Score = 4.1]− E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1], while the mediated effect
corresponds to E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = E[Quiz Score|Treatment]]− E[NMB|QUIZ,Quiz Score = 4.1].
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Table B.6: Treatment effects on NMB – linear probability model robustness checks
Dependent variable
NMB1 NMB2 NMB3
NO QUIZ -0.069 -0.011 0.055
(0.092) (0.095) (0.096)
ANSWERS -0.173* -0.098 -0.092 -0.098 -0.110 -0.056
(0.090) (0.289) (0.102) (0.156) (0.101) (0.183)
INCENTIVE -0.184** -0.366 -0.197** -0.316 -0.184* -0.374
(0.088) (0.294) (0.098) (0.203) (0.097) (0.234)
TWICE -0.237*** -0.283 -0.329 *** -0.378* -0.263*** -0.242
(0.082) (0.303) (0.092) (0.194) (0.093) (0.205)
PAPER -0.220 *** 0.893* -0.342*** 0.911** -0.301*** 0.697
(0.083) (0.454) (0.090) (0.409) (0.088) (0.460)
ENHANCED -0.206** -0.126 -0.295*** -0.330 -0.256*** -0.111
(0.086) (0.347) (0.095) (0.254) (0.094) (0.250)
Quiz Score -0.117*** -0.209*** -0.192***
(0.035) (0.022) (0.026)
ANSWERS × Quiz Score -0.020 -0.001 -0.016
(0.060) (0.040) (0.043)
INCENTIVE × Quiz Score 0.048 0.038 0.053
(0.059) (0.042) (0.048)
TWICE × Quiz Score 0.021 0.030 0.013
(0.058) (0.039) (0.041)
PAPER × Quiz Score -0.177** -0.180** -0.137*
(0.079) (0.069) (0.078)
ENHANCED × Quiz Score -0.005 0.030 -0.011
(0.067) (0.050) (0.046)
Intercept 0.395*** 0.873*** 0.592*** 1.450*** 0.526*** 1.313***
(0.057) (0.166) (0.057) (0.090) (0.058) (0.113)
Observations 308 265 308 265 308 265
R2 0.044 0.194 0.082 0.387 0.072 0.340
QUIZ is the omitted category. *, **, and *** respectively denote p < 0.1, p < .05, p < .01.
Robust (HC1) standard errors are in parentheses.
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across these treatments),1 while 47.4% of subjects in the QUIZ treatment misunderstand. A
simple ex-post power calculation indicates that if we recruited n1 = 76 and n2 = 38 subjects
to two treatments in which each subject misunderstands with probability p1 = .474 and
p2 = .216 (respectively), then we have a 79.4% chance of detecting a statistically significant
difference between treatments (at the 5% significance level). This suggests a reasonable
level of power in our comparisons between the four aformentioned treatments and QUIZ.
However, 33.3% of subject misunderstand in the ANSWERS treatment – an intermediate
case between QUIZ and these other four treatments. If we recruited n1 = 76 and n2 = 36
subjects to two treatments in which each subject misunderstands with probability p1 = .474
and p2 = .333 (respectively), then we have only a 33.2% chance of detecting a statistically
significant difference between treatments. If instead we recruited n1 = 38 and n2 = 36
subjects to two treatments in which each subject misunderstands with probability p1 = .216
and p2 = .333 (respectively), then we have only a 18.2% chance of detecting a statistically
significant difference between treatments. These calculations indicate that our sample sizes
are too small to reliably detect a statistically significant difference between our ANSWERS
treatment and the QUIZ treatment, or between the ANSWERS treatment and any of the
INCENTIVE, TWICE, PAPER, and ENHANCED treatments. If we instead view the NO
QUIZ and QUIZ, pooled, as baseline instructions treatments without reinforcement, and
the remaining treatments as enhanced instructions or reinforcement treatments, then our
samples have n1 = 119, n2 = 189, p1 = .462, and p2 = .238; under these samples sizes and
NMB probabilities, we had a 98.3% chance of detecting a significant difference in NMB.
Our statistical analysis was conducted in R (R Core Team, 2017). The regressions in Table
2.4 (and above) used the ‘lm’ and ‘glm’ command in the base ‘stats’ package, with robust
standard errors calculated using the ‘sandwich’ package (Zeileis 2004; 2006). Mediation
analysis used the ‘mediation’ package (Tingley et al., 2014). Goodman-Kruskal gamma
tests use the ‘DescTools’ package (Signorell, 2018). We used the ‘pwr’ package (Champely,
2018) for the power analysis reported above. Figures made in ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham, 2009).
D Post-experiment questionnaire
At suggestion of a referee and the editor, we added a post-experiment questionnaire to our
ENHANCED treatment, and ran additional sessions of the QUIZ treatment followed by
this questionnaire to paint a more complete picture of subjects’ decisionmaking processes
as they went though the experiment. We asked nine questions in total.
Our first observation is that there is no statistical difference between QUIZ and
ENHANCED on any of the first six quantitative questions.
1These numbers are relatively close to each other, so we use the 21.6% for our illustrative calculations
below.
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Q1.  Please think back to when you read the instructions and rate how much you agree with the 
following three statements on a scale of 1 to 7: 
 
 
i. The instructions were clear. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 




ii. I understood the best time to switch to task 2 (the slider task) – that is, when to switch in 
order to get the highest payment. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 




iii. I understood that I could only complete task 2 once. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 






Figure B.22: Post-experiment questionnaire (Page 2)
Q2. Please think back to when the experiment was underway and rate how much you agree 
with the following three statements on a scale of 1 to 7: 
 
 
i. My main goal in the experiment was to maximize my earnings. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 




ii. I remembered the best time to switch to task 2. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 




iii. I remembered that I could only complete task 2 once. 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Strongly         Neither      Strongly 
Disagree         Agree nor     Agree 






Figure B.23: Post-experiment questionnaire (Page 3)



































Q1i (Clarity) 5.7 (6) 5.4 (6) 0.31
Q1ii (Understood Optimum) 5.7 (7) 5.6 (7) 0.41
Q1iii (Understood Once) 5.4 (7) 5.9 (7) 0.55
Retention
Q2i (Maximized Earnings) 6.4 (7) 6.3 (7) 0.43
Q2ii (Remembered Optimum) 5.8 (7) 5.6 (6) 0.57
Q2iii (Remembered Once) 5.6 (7) 6.0 (7) 0.38
Mean (median) reported; p-values for rank-sum tests of equality of distributions.
Table B.7: Correlation between subjects’ evaluation and misunderstanding and quiz score
misunderstanding p.value_misunderstanding quiz score p.value_score
Q1i -0.168 0.159 0.281 0.017
Q1ii -0.267 0.024 0.202 0.089
Q1iii -0.406 0.0004 0.202 0.088
Q2i 0.039 0.744 0.046 0.700
Q2ii -0.371 0.001 0.383 0.001
Q2iii -0.356 0.002 0.196 0.100
Table B.7 shows that our post-experimental questionnaire results indicate that subjects
largely felt that they both understood and retained the key pieces of information from
the instructions – with the median subject indicating that they agreed or strongly agreed
that they understood and remembered when they should switch (Q1ii, Q2ii), and how
many times they could switch (Q1iii, Q2iii). In addition, most subjects agreed with the
statement “The instructions were clear”, with the median subject rating the statement
a 6 out of 7. We find no significant differences between the distribution of answers to
any of these questions between the QUIZ and ENHANCED treatments (p > .3 in all
pairwise comparisons, rank-sum tests). Since we do observe a difference in NMB revealed
in the experiment, our post-experimental questionnaire inadvertently reveals its limits at
diagnosing reasons for NMB and the potential for improvements. That being said, Table
C.3 indicates that subjects’ post-experiment answers strongly correlate with both NMB in
the experiment and quiz scores. Post-experiment reports of understanding (Q1ii,iii) and
retention (Q2ii,iii) were each negatively correlated with NMB (p < .03 in all cases). In
addition, the subject’s post-experimental agreement with the statement “The instructions
were clear” was positively correlated with their post-instructions quiz score (ρ = .281,
p = .017).
22 of the 72 subjects who wrote the questionnaire mentioned the instructions in their written
answers. Nearly all of these were in Q5: “What advice would you give to a future participant
in this experiment?” For instance, the first three subjects to mention the instructions
answered Q5 as follows: “Pay attention to the instructions.” “Do the experiment with
patience and read instructions very carefully.” “Read the instructions and follow them for
more $.” These are typical answers; many subjects recognized, ex post, that paying close
attention to the instructions was important for achieving the maximum payoff.
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21 of the 72 subjects who wrote the questionnaire showed some kind of mistaken
understanding of the experiment, even after having completed it. Many of these
misunderstandings were orthogonal to our variable of interest (the time to do task 2).
For instance, although our instructions clearly stated that one could get a $0.25 payoff for
each period of task 1 if a certain threshold was reached, many seemed to believe that one
could earn more than $0.25 by doubling or tripling the threshold. For instance, one subject
wrote, “You have a poodle that jumps on to platforms, each 75 units, you get paid 25c.”
Another one wrote, “Roughly, I would only get 50c at most doing poodle jump for the whole
period.” The payoff is fixed at 25 cents, so 50 would be impossible. Many subjects appear to
believe that they could earn for both tasks 1 and 2 if they completed the minimum height
before switching. This is a minor misunderstanding, though it is stated in the instructions
that one must forego earnings from one period of task 1 in order to perform task 2.
However, the majority of subjects do not show explicit misunderstandings in their answers,
and some even demonstrate learning. One subject who did not perform task 2 at the correct
time wrote, “I wasn’t aware I can only switch to task 2 only once. So I switched to task 2 in
the first period.” Another wrote, “I thought it didn’t mention number of times we could do
the bonus so I did it very early on.” These subjects clearly realized their mistakes after they
had made them, which suggests that repeated decisions (with feedback of some form) can
be a substitute for reinforcing understanding. On the other hand, some subjects failed to
understand our instructions and still didn’t understand them afterwards. One such subject
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“Mobility as a Service Apps and
Multimodal Transportation:
Evidence From a Multimodal App”
C.1 Robustness
In the main text of this paper, we chose to define a multimodal trip as one that started or
ended within 1 meter of a transit stop. The choice of 1 meter was somewhat arbitrary. Using
a larger radius creates the possibility of more false positives classified as multimodal while
reducing false negatives. With a radius of 10 meters, the criteria is likely to include trips
to businesses near bus stops. We do not expect these trips to be affected by the treatment,
so it ultimately adds noise to the regression. Thus, re-running the analysis with a higher
radius results in similar, but less statistically significant results. We present these results in
Tables C.1 and C.2.
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Table C.1: Effects of multimodal trip planning
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Whether a trip’s origin or destination is within 10m of a bus stop
Logit Model Probit Model





















Month Fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y
Area Fixed effects N N Y N N Y
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Whether a trip’s origin or destination is within 5m of a bus stop
Logit Model Probit Model





















Month Fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y
Area Fixed effects N N Y N N Y
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator whether variable showing whether a trip is
multimodal, i.e., its origin or destination is within 10m/5m of a bus stop. Standard errors clustered
at the month level are in parentheses and Newey-West standard errors are in brackets. All the trips’
origin or destination in the sample is within 5km of a bus stop. Cities with less than 50 trips are
excluded.
* Statistical significance at the 0.1 level.
** Statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
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Table C.2: Effects of multimodal trip planning on existing users
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Whether a trip’s origin or destination is within 10m of a bus stop
Logit Model Probit Model





















Month Fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y
Area Fixed effects N N Y N N Y
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Whether a trip’s origin or destination is within 5m of a bus stop
Logit Model Probit Model





















Month Fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y
Area Fixed effects N N Y N N Y
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator whether variable showing whether a trip is
multimodal, i.e., its origin or destination is within 10m/5m of a bus stop. Standard errors clustered
at the month level are in parentheses and Newey-West standard errors are in brackets. All the trips’
origin or destination in the sample is within 5km of a bus stop. Cities with less than 50 trips are
excluded. Only existing users’ data is used. Existing users are users who first installed the app prior
to the introduction of the multimodal feature.
* Statistical significance at the 0.1 level.
** Statistical significance at the 0.05 level.
*** Statistical significance at the 0.01 level.
103
